Confucianism and Phenomenology: An Exploration of Feeling, Value and Virtue by Yinghua Lu

This book adds to a growing list of monographs in the field of comparative philosophy that go beyond the narrow focus on Western intellectual traditions to understand the wide range of perennial questions regarding the human condition. Yinghua Lu in this comparative study takes a phenomenological turn to explore Confucianism in terms of feelings, values, and virtues, merging Max Scheler's phenomenology with the Confucian concept of liangxin 良心 (original heart–mind), liangzhi 良知 (original knowing), and tianli 天理 (heavenly pattern) that are most prominently associated with Mencius and Wang Yangming. The task itself is complex since the merging of different terminologies is, by its very nature, fraught with difficulties; the danger of under- and over-interpretation of each intellectual tradition so as to fit the task at hand is ever present.

Despite the obvious obstacles, Lu's overarching goal for this project is nevertheless praiseworthy. As he explains: "This work is an illustration of comparative philosophy with a phenomenological approach. It does not only enhance the understanding of one's own culture and alien culture through comparing their discussions on the relevant topic, but also provides meaningful resources to enrich and develop respective cultures" (p. 112). In other words, through this phenomenological study of Confucianism, our understanding of both Confucianism and Max Scheler is thus deepened and enriched. Lu's noble goal of intercultural enrichment is surely reflective of the larger aim of the field of comparative philosophy, which at the very minimum is to give those often overlooked and misunderstood non-Western intellectual traditions their fair shake in the Western academies to provide the world with viable conceptual alternatives beyond the confines of Western intellectual traditions. It is with this larger aim of the field of comparative philosophy in mind that one must cautiously navigate Lu's project of merging Scheler's phenomenology with Confucianism.

In addition to the "Introduction" and "Concluding Remarks," there are eleven chapters in total. In chapter 1, the book kick-starts the discussion on phenomenology with the apparent split between the sensible and the rational in the textual traditions of Hume and Kant and then contrasts it with the synthesis of the Mencian heart–mind as both intentional and sensible. Chapter 2 takes Scheler's understanding of feelings, values, and virtues that are hierarchally ranked with holy—that is, the pursuit of the infinite (p. 34)—as the highest value to interpret a wide range of Confucian texts from the Analects, Mencius, Zhongyong, to Wang Yangming's writings to demonstrate a similar set of hierarchal values, feelings, and virtues also exhibited in the greater Confucian textual tradition. Chapters 3 and 4 deal with Scheler's understanding of sympathy and love, and then apply that understanding to the greater Confucian textual tradition in order to again demonstrate the similar hierarchy in both textual traditions.

In terms of love, Lu concludes that "[i]n contrast with Buddhism, which negates the value of love, Christianity and Confucianism transforms a mere secular love into divine love and humane love" (p. 69). And since for Mencius, sympathy is the initial sprout for the virtue of ren 仁 (humaneness), the discussion of sympathy in Confucianism leads to the discussion of ren, and then ren eventually becomes the conceptual equivalent for Scheler's genuine love for God. The objectivity of Confucian morality, much like the objectivity of Christian morality, is said to be rooted in the transcendent source: tianli 天理 (Heavenly pattern) for Wang Yangming and God for Scheler, respectively. As Lu writes, "… for Scheler, genuine love is ensured by God as the absolute; for Wang, humane love is illustrated in terms of pure moral knowing [i.e. liangzhi] that is correlated with Heavenly pattern [i.e. tianli]" (p. 82). In short, Scheler's phenomenological approach to feelings, values, and virtues seems to find its resonance in Lu's understanding of the Mencian/Wang Yangming's concept of liangxin/liangzhi/tianli.

The same methodological approach to Scheler and the Confucian texts continues in chapter 5 on the topic of shame: taking Scheler's understanding of shame and applying it to the greater Confucian textual tradition. In chapter 6, shame is then discussed further in conjunction with yi 義 (righteousness). Unlike li 禮 (ritual) that allows for circumstantial transgressions, yi is an absolute principle rooted in xing 性 (original nature). As Lu writes, "… yi is a virtue of human nature (xing), which involves obeying one's duty. It is a value on the level of principle or pattern (li 理), which is a duty or an obligation of righteousness itself that permits no dodging. There is no essential difference between xing and li [i.e. 理 pattern] for the former is the embodiment of the latter in human beings" (p. 124). In short, much like ren, yi is also internally rooted in human nature, which has its transcendent source in tianli, and hence, the entire Confucian project of moral cultivation can be summed up as an intuitive realization of the heavenly endowed moral principles known aprioristically.

Moving from the internal feeling of shame to the external expression of jing 敬 (respect), chapter 7 compares jing with various Western intellectual and religious understandings of respect such as Kant, Scheler, and Christianity. To Lu, respect is not only a moral feeling as in "respect for person" (i.e., Kant) but also a religious feeling, a reverence toward God/tian. Tian, to Lu has a metaphysical significance and is akin to an anthropomorphic infinite that communicates, governs, punishes, and rewards human behaviors. A secular understanding of Confucianism, hence, is groundless. As he writes, "A number of people understand Confucian thought as a worldly ethics without any belief of the transcendental and the infinite. This opinion is ungrounded" (p. 141). After enumerating the various anthropomorphic acts of tian in the Confucian textual tradition, Lu concludes: "… although Heaven has no strong personality, Heaven still has a weak sense of personality none the less. The word Shang Di 上帝, the 'Lord on high,' which appears many times in Chinese classics, especially in pre-Zhou times, clearly indicates a personal deity. That is one reason why Chinese scholars choose Shang Di to translate 'God' in the modern vocabulary" (pp. 143–144). In other words, tian, even though it lacks a strong sense of anthropomorphism, has unmistakably transcendent significance and functions as the Confucian equivalent for the Christian God. In Lu's analysis, Confucianism cannot be encapsulated as a secular system of ethics. Tian/tianli is a transcendent/religious concept of the infinite, and it grounds the entirety of Confucian morality, and hence Confucianism is religious regardless of whether or not tian has a strong sense of anthropomorphism.

In chapter 8, jing is further discussed in conjunction with li 禮 (ritual) which has both a negative (limiting) and positive function. And the primary positive function of ritual, as Lu argues, "is to express the emotion of respect and humility, and thus to fulfill moral and religious tendencies" (p. 163). The difference between Confucian religiosity and Christianity seems to be one of degree, not of kind. As Lu concludes the discussion on the correlation between jing and ritual, "Given that Confucianism and Christianity both value religious and moral connotation of humility, Confucianism pays more attention to respect and humility toward others, whereas Christianity highlights reverence and humility toward God" (p. 163). Nevertheless, since tian, in Lu's analysis, is a transcendent infinite, Confucian morality is underpinned by its religiosity of tian, a functional equivalent for the Christian God in Christian morality.

Chapter 9 returns to the discussion of liangzhi as both a moral feeling and an intentional moral cognition as in the moral judgement of shi fei 是非 (approval and disapproval). And much like Scheler's objective hierarchy with holy—the pursuit of the infinite—as the highest value, Confucian liangzhi is also objectively ordered and heavenly endowed. And tianli, much like Scheler's holy, does not change. As Lu writes, "What is changeable is not the genuine order of li [i.e., 理 pattern] but instead the social norms (li 禮) that are variously adopted in meeting li's 理 order, including social, ethical, ritual, and legal codes, which are different manifestations of the same li 理" (p. 180). To introduce any degree of changeability undermines the absolute objectivity of tianli. As he writes, to "understanding the character '理 li' by both moral principles and specific social practices would cancel its absoluteness and objectivity" (p. 182). Tianli, in Lu's estimation, is not only definitively a religious concept, but is also an unchanging religious concept much like other monotheistic teachings.

Chapter 10 discusses the unity of moral knowing and moral action in Wang Yangming's teaching as opposed to Zhu Xi's apparent split between knowing and acting. Lu argues that for Wang Yangming, liangzhi never errs, and liangzhi and action are two sides of the same coin. Moral failure is the result of clouding one's original heart with selfish desires, but even in the weak sense, when one's liangzhi is aroused action has already taken place as moral judgment/cognition. Knowing is acting and vice versa; otherwise, one does not really know and does not really act. The apparent circularity in Wang Yangming's teaching (i.e., to do good, one must know the good, but to know the good, one must do good) (pp. 186–187), in Lu's view, is resolved not by just introducing the argument of the weakness of the will, but by recognizing that one's will to do good is ultimately motivated by a priori moral feelings (p. 190). Practice and study do help polish the mirror of one's original heart, but as Lu writes, it is "neither necessary nor possible to accomplish one of the two [i.e. knowing and acting] first, before achieving the other" (p. 202). In sum, our moral knowledge and moral motivation are all heavenly endowed, existing a priori, and necessarily giving rise to moral actions or at least moral cognition.

Chapter 11 offers a detailed discussion on xin 信 (trust), even though xin is not included in the Mencian four initial sprouts of moral emotions, nor in the Confucian four virtues (p. 201). Lu nevertheless offers an analysis on various manifestations of xin and its correlated emotive states such as distrust, faith, and deceit. Lu then recaps the entire project in his "Concluding Remarks" with the contrast between Zhu Xi/Xunzi's belief in the pernicious nature of the human heart–mind and Mencius/Wang Yangming's belief in the orderliness of human emotions/feelings as in liangzhi/liangxin. That orderliness of moral feelings is interpreted through the lens of Scheler's phenomenology. As Lu writes, "This book describes the a priori moral feelings in human nature in the Confucian context by following the path of Mencius and Wang Yangming, in light of Max Scheler's phenomenological description" (pp. 233–234). Ultimately, Lu's contribution to the field of comparative philosophy is to illustrate how our moral feelings, values, and virtues in our liangzhi/liangxin have a formal/objective/a priori order when interpreted phenomenologically. As Lu writes, "Pure moral knowing [i.e. liangzhi] indicates the concrete operation of moral feelings in terms of temporality, which in a broad sense is extended to moral reflection and judgment; Heavenly pattern [i.e. tianli] signifies the formal order of the heart, as well as values and the value system demonstrated by the order. These illustrations are my attempt to contribute to phenomenology, Chinese Philosophy and ethics" (p. 234).

Lu's phenomenological approach to Chinese philosophy is surely a novelty; no other project that I know of has taken such an interpretive route. Comparative philosophy is a complex field, since interpreting two or more distinct intellectual traditions that are situated in different historical times and contexts without missing the mark is a task not to be taken lightly. When using one textual tradition as the normative, conceptual, reference to interpret the other distinct textual tradition, the danger of conceptual replacement abounds. For instance, the concept of tian in the greater Confucian textual tradition, inarguably has religious/spiritual roots and connotations, but its religiosity/spirituality for the most part is not the focus textually nor historically in what is known as Confucian ethics. To equivocate tian with God, or to make tian a functional equivalent of God in Confucian ethics is to replace tian with God, since the concept of God is now the normative as well as the conceptual framework upon which we judge whether or not, tian is similar to or dissimilar from God, and subsequently, the complexity of the concept of tian is then superseded by, in comparison, the much more wholesome concept of God, however it is understood in greater religious communities. This sort of conceptual replacement does, in fact, hinder our deeper understanding of tian or how the concept of tian functions in Confucian ethics. The issue of conceptual replacement notwithstanding, Lu's phenomenological approach to the greater Confucian textual tradition is novel and praiseworthy.