Nature, Art, and Imitation: The Wild Boy of Aveyron as a Pivotal Case in the History of Psychology

N ature, A rt, and Im itation:onmlkjihgfedcbaZYXWVUTSRQPONMLKJIHGFEDCBA The W ild Boy of A veyron as a Pivotal Case in the H istory of Psychology D A V ID E. L E A R Y Historians of psychology have underestimated the importance of the eighteenth century. Focusing on the foundational conceptual contributions of Rene Descartes and John Locke, they have viewed eighteenth-century developments, by and large, as a mere unfolding of the logic inherent in various Cartesian and Lockean concepts.1 Even the establishment of associationism , so important in the subsequent history of psychology, is usu­ ally viewed in this way, as a mere elaboration of a Lockean principle, although Locke himself used the concept of association in a quite restricted, and pejorative, context.2 The thesis of this essay is that the eighteenth century was significantly more important in the history of pyschology than traditional treatments have implied.3 While it is obviously true that in some sense the intellectual developments of any century represent an unfolding of concepts implicitly or explicitly held in the previous century, the eighteenth-century develop­ ment of psychological thought did not constitute a mere unfolding, and certainly not a logically necessary one. For instance, Christian Wolff's dis­ tinction between empirical and rational psychology, which has had such significant and continuing influence on the history of the discipline, was not necessarily indicated by the work of either Descartes or Locke, even 155 156 / LEARY though the distinction has been read back into their work by countless subsequent analysts.4 Similarly, whatever their previous histories, the eighteenth-century distinctions between, and articulations of the concepts of reason and feeling, mechanism and vitalism, monism and dualism, sen­ sation and perception, the passions and the interests, the instincts and the reflexes —and many more —have had lasting critical effects upon the history of psychology.5 This paper will not focus on any of these dichotomies or individual concepts, important though they are. Rather, the fundamental distinction upon which this essay revolves is that between Nature and Art, or be­ tween the natural and the artificial. The primary question raised in this essay concerns the proper domain of the newly emerging discipline of psy­ chology. In eighteenth-century terms, the possible domains of psychology — assuming that pyschology was about to detach itself from its traditional affiliation with philosophy—were either the domain of physiology and medicine or the domain of the 'moral sciences." Of course, the choice of affiliation (and thus of conceptual and methodological framework) de­ pended largely upon the view taken of human nature. As is well known, there was much debate throughout the eighteenth century about the nature of man, and about man's optimal state: whether man is more properly a creature of nature (idealized in some instances as a Noble Savage) or a creature of society (that is, a product of artificially structured institu­ tions and interactions).6 This essay proposes that the issue was not so much solved as dissolved, that neither natural nor artificial factors were ultimately accorded a univocal endorsement, and that in fact modern psy­ chology (or at least a significant portion of it) emerged precisely at the RQPONML juncture of Nature and Art, as a discipline attempting to elucidate the interactions between the physiological and social realms. To make this point, this essay will draw attention to one particular his­ torical episode, the case of the Wild Boy of Aveyron, which was both emblematic of, and influential in, the testing, modification, and integra­ tion of ideas that had been common throughout the century. This case was also chosen for exposition because, besides dissolving the controversy regarding the role of natural as opposed to artificial factors in the develop­ ment of human character, it also led to the formal postulation of a psy­ chological concept which has remained central to much psychological thought since that time —the concept of Imitation. If this concept (and for that matter the entire triad of Nature, Art, and Imitation) is reminis­ cent of eighteenth-century aesthetic theory, that may not be entirely coinci­ dental. Like other psychological concepts, Imitation seems to have been plucked full grown from eighteenth-century aesthetic thought...