Beijing's Bind

Preserving the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty intact, unmodified, is the centerpiece of China's diplomatic attempt to forestall NMD deployment. Assuming the United States will, at a minimum, begin to deploy an NMD system optimized to deal with North Korean and other "rogue" state ballistic missiles, even this limited system, known as C-1, includes elements in its architecture ¹ that are not currently permitted by the 1972 ABM Treaty, which, among other things, prohibits a nationwide defense against ballistic missiles. ² Intended or not, the system would have an impact on China's small intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) force, which numbers approximately 20. ³

Should the Russians not agree to modify the ABM Treaty, the United States will be faced with three alternatives. The first two, either dropping the idea of NMD altogether or developing a new architecture that is ABM Treaty-compliant, seem highly unlikely since neither option would provide protection for the entire United States. The third option would be to withdraw from the ABM Treaty altogether, after giving the required six months' notice. This last alternative, which today seems to be the most likely should modification attempts prove unsuccessful, would be a disaster from Beijing's perspective because it would leave the United States free to select any mix of land and space-based NMD options unconstrained by international agreement. This means that Beijing, by objecting to changes in the ABM Treaty, is pursuing an anti-NMD policy course of action that has a high probability of making Beijing's strategic circumstances worse. ⁴

Background

Until mid-1999, China policy did not clearly distinguish between theater missile defense (TMD) and NMD in its interactions with the United States. This is not because individuals in China did not understand the difference. In fact, both technical and conceptual specialists in China understood what NMD was all about and understood the implications of this latest U.S. attempt to develop a defense against ICBMs. For decades there has been a group of scientists and technologists within China who closely followed the on-again, off-again U.S. missile defense debates--especially Reagan-era Strategic Defense Initiative developments. ⁵

China has also appreciated the impact that a successful missile defense could have on its strategic deterrent missile force. But, as a general proposition, this technical and strategic awareness was not translated into an overt policy position until late 1996. At that time, the beginning of an anti-NMD policy line began to publicly emerge. Even then, Beijing's focus was more on TMD and how U.S. theater systems might affect China's ICBM force. Chinese policy did not clearly differentiate between TMD and NMD until the later half of 1999.

Earlier that summer, the United States adopted an official NMD policy when, on July 22, 1999, President Bill Clinton signed legislation that stated U.S. policy was to deploy an NMD system as soon it was technologically possible. The purpose of such a system was to protect all U.S. territory against limited missile attacks from rogue nations. Although not specifically stated, the system would also presumably have the ability to defend against accidental or unauthorized launches from rogues as well as Russia and China. ⁶ This was followed on October 2, 1999, by a successful NMD test, when an NMD interceptor hit a test warhead that was travelling at ICBM range and speed.

In Beijing, the legislation and subsequent successful test seemed to have had a galvanizing effect. A policy line specifically oriented toward NMD emerged. Before examining Beijing's reaction more closely, a look at China's strategic nuclear circumstances is necessary in order to understand the context in which its policy was formulated.

Vulnerability of China's Strategic Deterrent

Since October 16, 1964, the day China exploded its first atomic bomb, China's declared strategic doctrine has been retaliatory in nature. The official statement made that day continues to guide China's nuclear strategy: "The Chinese government hereby solemnly...