The Rewards of Punishment: A Relational Theory of Norm Enforcement (review)

Christine Horne's new work addresses several important theoretical questions and presents a cohesive argument regarding norm enforcement, an under-theorized topic important for our understanding of human behavior.

In the initial section of the book Horne reviews three of the main theories of norms, (1. the different aspects of the normative act, (2. the consequences for the community members, and (3. the meaning attached to it or its frequency. As Horne points out, the predominant theories of norms do not focus much attention on the enforcement of norms. For example there is no explanation of why individuals punish those who violate norms, often times at a cost to themselves.

Horne goes on to describe her own theory of norm enforcement, which is based primarily on the interdependence of individuals within a group. Horne's arguments rely heavily on two prior research streams. The first is exchange theory, the second is social capital. Her theory draws heavily on Linda Molm's work on coercive power and punishment in exchange. But the benefit of Horne's argument is that she deftly combines the concept of dependence and reinforcement principles from exchange theory with the broader concepts of networks and norms from research on social capital, in particular work by Robert Putnam.

Horne's theory of interdependence argues that it is the characteristics of individuals' social relationships that provide incentives for them to sanction others. People are more likely to sanction when the violation of that norm could potentially harm those who are close to them. The more an individual values those around him or her, the more likely he or she is to sanction (e.g., mothers are more likely to sanction those who engage in domestic abuse, because the victim could be her child).

In addition to addressing norm enforcement, Horne's theory of interdependence also extends to metanorms, those particular norms that regulate sanctioning. While sanctioning a norm violator benefits the entire group, the individual who carries out the sanction bears a cost. Metanorms offset the cost of sanctioning (40), by rewarding only the person doing the sanctioning for his or her behavior. The individual who sanctions the norm violator receives extra benefits, usually in the form of praise or approval from the rest of the group. Most people value approval from their peers and social relations. The more individuals value these relationships, the more likely they will enforce norms. In general, individuals who want to maintain relationships support norms and norm enforcers. In close communities where individuals are more reliant on one another (e.g., they are more dependent on each other) norms and norm enforcement tend to be stronger. The obvious conclusion from this argument is that when individuals are more isolated from one another (this does not need to be physical distance, just lack of interdependence), there is a diffusion of responsibility that can lead to a lack of norm enforcement. This is precisely the issue of atomization that Putnam describes. While Horne's argument can lead us to this conclusion, it says very little about how to build relationships that are interdependent, which would remedy this potential problem in our communities.

In modern society people generally live in communities where there are institutions designed to enforce norms, such as governments and police, so people do not have to rely on each other as much for the enforcement of norms, especially where the costs may be too high (e.g., catching criminals, enforcing traffic rules, etc.). But, the relationship between laws and norm enforcement is a complex one. Horne experimentally shows how the presence of such an organization can weaken the enforcement of norms. She finds experimentally, that when low cost legal systems exist, individuals will use it, they interact less with one another, and their interdependence is reduced. This may be true with norms that have relatively low cost to enforce. However, when the cost for enforcement is high, like Hardin, I suggest that...