Class And Labor in Iran: Did the Revolution Matter? (review)

Social revolutions involve transformations of state and class structures. By this definition, the 1979 Iranian revolution, which, toppled the monarchy and established an Islamic Republic, constituted a social revolution. For more than two decades, scholarly debates focused on the causes and processes of the revolution. Most academic works paid little attention to the precise nature of changes in the post-revolutionary social structure. In this excellent, empirically based book, Nomani and Behdad analyze the impact of the 1979 revolution on the Iranian class structure.

The book examines the reconfiguration of Iran's labor force in the last three decades and presents a conceptual framework for analyzing social classes. Although both authors are economists by training, their analytic perspective relies heavily on the works of leading sociologists, particularly Erik Wright. Given the specificities of a state-based economy, they modify existing sociological concepts to explain Iran's development. They argue that with the revolution, the new state began a quest for an Islamic utopia, claiming to abolish the class of Taghot, or those driven by the arrogance of wealth and power, and institute the rule of the Mostazafin, the oppressed and the powerless. They proclaimed their intention to eradicate poverty, exploitation, and end the "imperialism of East and West" through a petty bourgeois Shi'i theocracy. But, Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers opposed radical ideas that would eliminate private property and establish an Islamic socialist economy. Instead, they declared that the Islamic state would act as arbiter and grantor of class balance to generate relative equality.

Yet, according to Nomani and Behdad, post-revolutionary conflicts quickly put Iran's economy in a crisis as social confrontation challenged the sanctity of property, disrupting production and accumulation. This process, "structural involution," was accompanied with the expansion of petty-commodity economic activities, deproletarianization, peasantization of agriculture, and expansion of service activities. The involutionary process lasted for first ten years. During the period, Iran's real national income per capita declined by 58 percent, as the population grew from 38 million to 53 million. Unfavorable economic realities revealed the "futility of the Islamic utopian dream of the leaders of the Islamic state." (45) At the same time, corruption and clientalism provided ample opportunities for accumulating wealth by those who had access to the state. Thus, Bonyad Mostasafan, The Foundation of the Oppressed, composed of 400 companies, became the largest economic entity in the Middle East.

The death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989 marked the beginning of the second period, the "deinvolutionary" process, which usually begins with normalization of economic activities, reconstitution of the capitalist relations of production, restoration of capital accumulation, proletarianization of the workforce and depeasantization of agriculture. Adversely affected by the revolutionary struggles, the bourgeoisie launched its battle in the political arena and raised the banner of economic liberalism, demanding denationalization of industries and deregulation of the market. Proponents of liberalization also favored cutting subsidies and lifting price controls to expand profit and production, which would have certainly reduced the population's standard of living. Widespread mass opposition forced the government to retreat from liberalization, which would have adversely affected its own support base. In the absence of liberalization, most players in the market continue to be concerned about the monopolistic privileges of various revolutionary foundations, the Revolutionary Guard, and other revolutionary institutions that form the Islamic Republic's base. "Almost three decades after the revolution, Iran has not fully overcome its post-revolutionary economic crisis." (62)

The book carefully examines primary data, especially census statistics, to explore the impact of the revolution on the Iranian class structure and state policies on employment and workforce. In particular, the authors analyze population growth, the situation of women, the urban and rural division, and the nature of lifelong opportunities resulting from the revolution. Most importantly, they meticulously present details of the changes in the country's class structure. Their analysis reveals that by 1996, the petty bourgeoisie, self-employed entrepreneurs who constituted...