Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy—From Kennedy to Reagan (review)

BOOK REVIEWS 283 considerable prior knowledge, at times mentioning an event without explaining in sufficient depth its importance. Notwithstanding these criticisms, The Palestinian Entity is an important contribution to the field and can be read profitably by both the specialist and the layman. Shemesh has extensively mined the Arab press, other primary Arabic sources, andJordanian intelligence reports captured in the 1967 war, shedding new light on the role of the Palestinian cause in Arab politics. Managing the Presidency: The Eisenhower Legacy—From Kennedy to Reagan. By Phillip G. Henderson. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1988. 198 pp. Reviewed by Marian Gibbon, M.A. candidate, SAIS. During the closing months of the Reagan administration, numerous books and documents analyzing the function of the National Security Council (NSC) within the foreign policymaking apparatus of the U.S. government were published. The Iran-Contra scandal clearly demonstrated the need to reorganize the NSC so that it might function in an advisory capacity, rather than as an independent policymaking body. With this premise, Phillip G. Henderson's Managing the Presidency argues that the Eisenhower administration managed the foreign policy sector of the government efficiently and smoothly. As a result, Eisenhower produced carefully balanced policies and decisions. Henderson maintains that any incoming president would do well to look back to Eisenhower's organizational style to find a model for effective foreign policymaking and implementation. According to Henderson, successive presidencies have centralized decisionmaking , which has contributed to a mismanaged White House, clashes between the NSC and the State Department, misguided policies— a state of affairs which recently culminated in the Iran-Contra scandal. Stricter organization, a smaller NSC staff and more stringent guidelines for a neutral advisory role for the national security adviser might have side-stepped the incoherent policies produced in the lax atmosphere of the Reagan White House. Henderson refutes past charges of excessive bureaucracy and rigid decisionmaking structures in the Eisenhower administration. Instead, he paints an idyllic portrait of Eisenhower's White House. Regular, well-organized meetings were held with the president routinely in attendance at the NSC, Cabinet meetings, or at bi-partisan congressional briefings. The president allowed room for disagreement between Cabinet and Council members—in fact, he encouraged such differences, for they gave him a clear picture of both sides of any issue, allowing him to make considered decisions on the matters at hand. Henderson writes that Eisenhower was not a military man turned politician, but rather a man of natural political instinct who knew the art of persuasion and how to delegate effectively. He used the Cabinet and the NSC as advisory bodies, and made most final decisions himself. Policy implementation was carefully regulated by the Operations Coordinating Board, but ultimate 284 SAIS REVIEW foreign-policy authority remained within the jurisdiction of the State Department . The president met frequently with a small number of advisors, particularly at the end of his administration, but Henderson concludes that these meetings never supplanted regular NSC meetings. Eisenhower consistently used the NSC for "promoting forward planning, facilitating open debate and assisting the president in crystallizing policy options." Since Eisenhower's terms in office, the formulation of foreign policy has become more informal. Presidents have failed to clarify job descriptions adequately and have relied heavily on small groups of trusted advisors. The national security adviser is no longer the neutral policy coordinator he once was, so that he tends to compete with the secretary of state and the secretary of defense , who are the administration's legitimate policymakers. Henderson draws a lesson from his comparisons between the Eisenhower style of management and those ofsuccessive presidents: an institutionalized, organized means of policy formulation and implementation, with job responsibilities clearly delineated by the president, avoids the problems that will occur if the NSC, the Department of State, and the Department of Defense are at loggerheads. While Henderson's recommendations are valid, thoughtful, and timely, his supporting evidence often exaggerates the truth. Dwight D. Eisenhower was harshly criticized for heavy-handed leadership upon leaving office. However, in his attempt to revise some of those severe judgments, Henderson errs too far on the other side, depicting Eisenhower as nearly perfect. He finds little to fault in Eisenhower's administrative...