Decolonization and the State in Kenya (review)

222 SAIS REVIEW to seek a solution are the burden Namibia places on a strained national budget and international pressures to end Namibia's colonial status. Reasons for maintaining the status quo are the political weight of the militant Afrikaner population residing in Namibia and the potential security threat posed by another independent state straddling the South African border. The author shows that the result ofthese conflicting pressures is the "Botha Strategy," in which supposedly earnest negotiations are periodically sabotaged by South African military campaigns. Since Botha's ascendancy in 1978 every breakthrough in the Namibian talks has been followed by raids on SWAPO bases or offices in Angola, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. In light of the political realities Botha faces, Jaster is pessimistic about any negotiated resolution for Namibia. He concludes, "Ultimately perhaps only a prolonged insurgency—one far more effective than that waged by SWAPO so far—would generate the sorts of pressures that alone might force [Botha and] Namibia's white minority to accept desegregation and a government of national reconciliation dominated by SWAPO." Hanlon concludes that changes in Pretoria's behavior can be made through coordinated international economic sanctions against South Africa, but the sanctions must be accompanied by massive Western aid for, and investment in, the SADCC states. South Africa is likely to use its considerable economic and military muscle to retaliate with "countersanctions" against its neighbors; thus the West must help to bolster their defenses. This view assumes that the West is both willing and able to assume responsibility for the future security and development of southern Africa while Pretoria stands ready to threaten any project that might increase the autonomy of the SADCC nations. In this era of fiscal austerity and shrinking aid budgets, there is little evidence that Western governments could make the necessary commitment even if the political will to do so existed. Taken together, the two books show how South Africa has achieved a position of regional power that dilutes the effect of external political pressures. Any initiative from outside seeking to influence Pretoria's regional policies must coincide with positive changes in South Africa's internal political constellation. One is left with the cynical thought that meaningful policy reform during Botha's reign will remain only a political pipe dream for those who closely follow development in southern Africa. Decolonization and the State in Kenya. By David F. Gordon. Boulder, Colo. : Westview Press, 1986. 265 pp. $25.00/cloth. Reviewed by Gilbert Khadiagala, Ph.D. candidate, SAIS. The politics of Kenya's transition from colonial administration to independence have attracted considerable interest since the British government decided in early 1980 to declassify colonial documents. This process has opened up a wealth of once classified reports that have assisted in filling the gaps in Kenya's colonial history. In Decolonization and the State in Kenya David F. Gordon uses original imperial sources to provide a comprehensive historical account of the events BOOK REVIEWS 223 and issues surrounding Kenya's decolonization process between 1945 and 1963. The author's thesis is that the decolonization process in Kenya was propelled by the inability of the colonial state to reconcile the twin imperatives of economic accumulation and political conquest. Under the aegis of a settler-dominated state, the author cites the need to derive economic benefits from the country as the raison d'être of formal colonization of Kenya. After having strengthened their grip on the apparatus of the state, the prime commitment of the settler colonial authorities was to pursue a pattern of accumulation dependent solely upon the alienation of African land and the exploitation of African labor. However, this mode of accumulation generated problems in the greater political economy; foremost of these problems was the issue of African nationalism, which arose to challenge the colonial state. The author uses his exhaustive examination of colonial reports to support his principal argument: the post-World War II colonial strategy of piecemeal agrarian reforms contained in the Swynnerton Plan of 1954 clearly reflected the colonial state's increasing inability to contain the tide of African nationalism while the authorities tried to maintain accumulation patterns pursued since the onset of colonial rule in Kenya. In the...