Nietzsche and Metaphysics (review)

3a2 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 35:2 APRIL a997 reading of his philosophical works implies. Carl convincingly demonstrates that Frege rejected idealism as well as skepticism (~o1-11), but, strangely enough, he does not think that this is reason to think that Frege was a realist about abstract objects. CHARLES LANDESMAN Hunter Collegeand the Graduate Schoolof the City Universityof New York Peter Poellner. Nietzsche and Metaphysics. New York: Clarendon Press, a995. Pp. xii + 32o. Cloth, $55.oo. The writer who takes on Nietzsche inevitably must make an excruciating choice in determining how to confront the unique combination of factors that constitutes Nietzsche 's philosophical work. On the one hand, Nietzsche critically engages a broad range of views prominent in Western philosophy, which have been treated with increasing rigor and sophistication since their hazy beginnings among the pre-Socratics. While his historical understanding of its details is admittedly uneven, it is safe to assume that Nietzsche was cognizant of this general development. On the other hand, he brings with him a remarkably diverse set of weapons and techniques, all informed by what one might call his "nihilistic FrOhlichkeit."Hence we see relatively traditional philosophical arguments combined, occasionally on the same page, with polemic, aphorism, poetry, paradox, and unabashed ad hominem attack. Unless one hopes to emulate both the style and content of Nietzsche's own work, one must choose whether to engage in the kind of "philosophical laboring" Nietzsche despises, or to adopt the idiosyncratic tone of his writing that is at the same time so playful yet so acerbic. This second approach, as may be seen in various postmodern accounts of Nietzsche, all too often sacrifices the content of that philosophy in the attempt to preserve its wit. Peter Poellner, as he himself remarks, adopts the former approach in order to engage the content of Nietzsche's philosophy, rather than exploit it for mere Derridean "word play" (28). The result of this philosophical laboring is a valuable, if workmanlike, study of central themes in Nietzsche's epistemology and metaphysics. Poellner's book develops the view that throughout Nietzsche's work one finds "a pervasive sceptical strand of thought" (11), which does not, however, commit him to a position that is itself skeptical. By means of this contrast, Poellner takes up--often in some detail--various theses Nietzsche puts forth, including the rejection of metaphysical realism, along with the ascetic ideal and its demand for truth, the Nietzschean reinterpretation of the Newtonian/Boscovichean notion of force, the role of teleology, and, of course, the will to power. Poellner correctly focuses on the latter as fundamental to Nietzsche's critical reaction, which allows him to reject the vast range of philosophical "solutions" and, more generally, the stances from which those solutions arise, whether Platonism, Rationalism, Empiricism, or Idealism. Yet at times Nietzsche defines 'will' so broadly that he risks sacrificing much of the interest of his own approach, a point occasionally alluded to by Poellner (237f.; 249), albeit without adequately developing it. On Nietzsche's analysis (as presented by Poellner), where S desires p, and BOOK REVIEWS 313 r is a reason or set of reasons for p, r either becomes an expression of the will to power or is a case of S's self-deception. It is not clear how this account differs structurally from the "argument" that purports to prove one is an alcoholic: if asked "Are you an alcoholic?" either an affirmative or a negative response will result in the desired admission : answering "No," after all, is a clear case of denial, essentially symptomatic of the condition. In the years since the publication of Walter Kaufmann's still-useful Nietzsche: PhiIosopher , Psychologist, Antichrist, Nietzsche has been well-served by the philosophical labors of his critics. Poellner mentions Richard Schacht's Nietzsche, Rfidiger Grimm's Nietzsche's Theory of Knowledge, and Maudemarie Clarke's Nietzsche on Truth and Philosophy (and, to be sure, books on all aspects of his work continue to flow unabated). Rather than providing a sustained discussion with these important texts, Poellner chooses rather to introduce his own account by specifying in summary fashion his disagreements with each of them. The debate might have...