The "Cratylus": Plato's Critique of Naming (review)

Book Reviews Timothy M. S. Baxter. The "Cratylus": Plato's Critique ofNaraing. Philosophia Antiqua, 58. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1992. Pp. x + 203. Cloth, $57.25. Recent years have seen a revival of interest in Plato's Cratylus. Several studies have examined the theories of the correctness of names advanced in the dialogue and the criticisms Socrates/Plato develop against them. However, there has not been up to now a comprehensive study of the dialogue in English which examines, in addition to the above issues, other important aspects of the dialogue--for example, the character and purpose of the etymologies that constitute half of the dialogue and the relation of the dialogue to the rest of Plato's thought. Failure to answer the questions about the character and purpose of the section on etymologies leaves half of the Platonic text somewhat of a mystery, while failure to relate the dialogue to the rest of the Platonic corpus encourages the familiar complaints that the Cratylus is an oddity in Plato's thought and lacks any philosophical significance. Timothy Baxter's recent book aims at providing such a comprehensive study of the dialogue and, in particular, at solving the problems about the character and purpose of the section devoted to etymologies. Indeed, he devotes almost half of the book to these latter problems and proposes some quite interesting theses about the etymologies and their reladon to the theories of the correctness of names, to Plato's personal philosophical development, and to his views on the use or abuse of etymologizing in the Greek literary and philosophical traditions from Homer to Socrates' contemporaries. Baxter's observations on these matters and his detailed analyses of some of the Socratic/Platonic etymologies are illuminating and constitute, in my judgment, the best part of this study. The structure of Baxter's book parallels that of the Cratylus. He thus begins with an examination of the three theories of the correctness of names (Cratylus' natural correctness , Hermogenes' conventionalism, and Socrates' amended theory of natural correctness ). Baxter draws a distinction between prescripdve and descriptive theories of naming : "A prescriptive theory of naming lays down the properties that make a name a correct name, whilst a descriptive theory by contrast tries as far as possible to eschew a pr/or/considerations about what a name should or should not be in order to qualify as a correct name in favour of drawing conclusions from the names in existing languages" (4). He then argues that the theories of both Cratylus and Hermogenes deny this distinction, and this has unfortunate consequences. Baxter's distinction'is a meaningful and important one, but I am not clear as to whether it helps us understand the views of Cratylus and Hermogenes. As presented, it allows for something to be a name without [661] 669 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3~:4 OCTOBER 199 4 satisfying the conditions the prescriptive theory recluires of a correct name. But as Baxter notes, both Cratylus and Hermogenes deny that anything which does not meet the conditions of their respective theories is a name at all. Does the distinction between prescriptive and descriptive theories of naming do justice to their theories? It seems that their aim is to identify the necessary (and sufficient) conditions for being a name at all, and not only a correct or ideal one. The distinction, however, seems to fit nicely Socrates' and Plato's views, especially when they employ the analogy of tools and their corresponding functions to explain the correctness of names. As the discussion of tools and their functions in Repub//c I makes clear, many things can perform a certain function without being the best or ideal things for performing that function. Socrates and Plato see no difficulty in there being names which are not correct or ideal in the way a prescriptive theory of naming may require and, according to Baxter, allow that "there are degrees of names, some better than others" (84). Baxter's discussion of the Socratic position is thoughtful and informative. He has important things to say about the possibility of false names, the namegiver, naming as an art (techne), and so on. Using the prescriptive...