Darwin and the Emergence of Evolutionary Theories of Mind and Behavior (review)

144 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 28" 1 JANUARY 199o name neo-Kantianism is generally used only for the time following 188o.s And is K6hnke really beingjust toward later neo-Kantianism in reckoning the 187os as a high point after which only a period of decline could follow? HELMU'r HOLZHEY Universityof Zurich Robert J. Richards. Darwin and the Emergenceof Evolutionary TheoriesofMind and Behav- /or. Science and Its Conceptual Foundations Series. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1987. Pp. xvii + 7oo. $34.95. This fascinating book operates at two levels, possibly three. At the most straightforward level, it is a history of science, telling the tale of the fate of evolutionary ideas as they have been applied to mind and behavior during the past two centuries, with special emphasis on the nineteenth century. At another level, Richards is acting qua philosopher, for he thinks the story he has to tell has important implications for philosophy. In particular, he thinks the people he discusses show the way to compelling theories of evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary ethics. To this end he attaches two philosophical appendices to his book, articulating and defending his philosophical claims. Then, at perhaps a third level, Richards uses his historical narrative as a case study (and possibly an exemplar) for his philosophy, especially his epistemology , trying to justify and illustrate his position. Let me take these levels in turn, briefly. First, we have the history. Anybody who knows anything at all about the history of science will know that the subject is clogged with overproduction and overinterpretation around a few key figures. Chief among these is Charles Darwin, and if ever anyone writes anything again on his discovery of natural selection, I for one will scream. What I have long suspected-- and what Richards shows in full detail--is that, because of their tunnel vision, the historians of science thereby ignore huge fertile areas, which go untouched. And the paradox is that the narrow perspective means that important aspects of those overdiscussed figures go unanalyzed! Certainly, Richards plows virgin territories, and thereby throws new light on many important figures in biology, psychology, and philosophy--not the least of which is Darwin himself. Richards starts in the eighteenth century with the first growths of evolutionary thought, showing that from the beginning thinkers recognized that humankind had to be part of the problem, and that this meant (in particular) human thought and behavior. I was glad to see a full discussion of Charles Darwin's grandfather, Erasmus Darwin. We are now starting to realize how he merits interest in his own right, not just as a curious anticipation of his more famous grandson. Moving forward, Richards shows how Erasmus Darwin struggled constantly with the problem of the human mind, as did Frenchmen like Lamarck. These and other thinkers were all known to s See H. Holzhey, "Neukandanismus," in HistorischesWOrterbuchderPhilosopfiie,vol.6 (1984), column 747ft. BOOK REVIEWS 145 Charles Darwin, and a significant part of Richards's discussion is devoted to showing just how much of Charles Darwin's thought on mind and behavior was built out of the work of others--with his own distinctive twists. Richards emphasizes, and I am sure he is right here, that natural theology was crucial to the development of Charles Darwin's thinking. It was not, as many critics have claimed, a case of Darwin throwing off religion and then taking up evolution. Rather, he has led to his evolution through his religion. Richards is almost unique among twentieth-century thinkers in finding virtue in the work of Herbert Spencer. I am still not convinced that Spencer was other than a tedious Victorian chauvinist. But no doubt I will not be the only scholar who is happy to have a Spencer apologist against whom one can test one's critical opinions. To be commended without reservation, however, is Richards's detailed analysis of the psychobiological thinking of William James. Richards delicately balances his knowledge of James's own psychological states (including facts still suppressed) with conceptual analysis of James's scientific claims. I do not know if this counts as "externalist" or "internalist " history of science, but it certainly shows that knowledge...