Pascal's Theory of Scientific Knowledge

Pascal's Theory of Scientific Knowledge KEITH ARNOLD 1. INTRODUCTION TO track the truth with our theories, hypotheses, and beliefs requires procedures and methods which are reliable.' Pascal's theory of scientific knowledge is a theory of reliability and the quest for truth that offers an account of the procedures and methods by which truth may be discriminated and located. ~ These aspects of his theory of scientific knowledge Pascal illustrates with the following analogy. Think of our true hypotheses and beliefs as though they were real diamonds of great value. False hypotheses and beliefs may sometimes resemble diamonds, but they will be worthless fakes, fauxjewels. Tracking and finding the truth is like looking for a real diamond in a pile of fake ones. Methods and procedures that do not meet Pascal's criteria for reliability may allow one to scoop up a handful of stones, in which there is a real diamond. But none can be discarded or selected, because the truth has not been tracked. The reliable method is the one that enables one to grasp the true diamond between finger and thumb and pull it out. ~ Pascal believed a theory of knowledge requires two complementary parts. One is the faculty of mind he calls le coeur, which we would call intuition or ' On tracking and reliability, see Robert Nozick, PhilosophicalExplanations (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1981), W8--79, and 264-68. For discussion, also see Alvin Goldman, Epistemologyand Cognition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1986), 44-46. Pascal, Oeuvres, vol. 9, "De l'esprit g~om6trique," 24o-42; "De l'art de persuader," 287-91; Pens~es, la7-18 (#2o8), 216 (#425), 223 (#431). All references to Pascal's work are to the Brunschvicg, Boutroux and Gazier edition: Oeuvres de Blaise Pascal, 14 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 19o4-1914, reprinted 1965). I also give page and section numbers in the Phillippe Sellier edition of the Pens~es(Mercure de France, t976). All translations from the French and Latin are my own. s Oeuvres, vol. 9, "De l'art de persuader," 287-88. For Pascal's discussions of truth, see also Oeuvres, voi. 2, Prefacesur le Trait~du vide, 136-37 and Pens~es,216 (#425). For Pascal'sdiscussions of reliability, see also Oeuvres, vol. 2, "R6ponse de Blaise Pascal au tr~s bon r6v~rend pbre Noel," IOO--lOl;Preface sur le Trait[ du vide, 136; "Lettre de Pascal ~ M. P6rier," 159 and 162;R~cit de la grande experiencedes liqueurs, 371-72. [531 ] 539 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 27:4 OCTOBER 1989 insight. It yields principles and concepts of abstract generalization, by which truth begins to be tracked. The complement to this is the faculty of mind Pascal calls esprit or sometimes esprit de gdomdtrie. We would call it the ability to reason, to solve problems, to use measurements, to construct proofs. 4 This essay is only concerned with Pascal's contribution of this second part to the theory of scientific knowledge. While Pascal's theory of intuition and the "logic of the heart" is interesting, it is the theory of reasoning and measurement and experimentation which is strikingly brilliant, for Pascal's time, and for ours. Lord Kelvin, the nineteenth-century British physicist, once wrote: "When you can measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers, you know something about it; but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot express it in numbers, your knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind. ''5 Pascal's theory of knowledge endorses these views about measurement . He extended the use of measurement to new areas, such as beliefs and evidence. His account of reliable methods in terms of measurement is reflected in a number of his inventions or discoveries. Pascal set out how to do an experiment, how to test a hypothesis, how to collect a set of data. He designed the first experiment with a control group, and showed how to analyze the results. His theory of scientific knowledge is, in part, an explanation of how to evaluate hypotheses, how to measure evidence, and how to arrive at a scientifically warranted decision. To do this, he used scientific instruments to measure effects...