The Development of Character in Kantian Moral Theory

The Development of Character in Kantian Moral Theory JEAN P. RUMSEY 1. INTRODUCTION IN HER I985 PAPER, "The Practice of Moral Judgment," Barbara Herman carefully analyzes Kant's account of that process. On the basis of her analysis Herman postulates what she calls "Rules of Moral Salience" as an essential part of that process. In the absence of sufficient textual evidence to warrant postulation of such rules, she claims that they, or something like them, are needed to make a Kantian account of moral judgment work. Her project, then, is not to provide a faithful exegesis of Kant's views, but to provide a "normative reconstruction" of Kantian ethics, in order to present "a plausible moral theory that is clearly and distinctly Kantian."~ This paper, similarly constrained, is an effort to arrive at a plausible account of the development of character which is clearly Kantian, but which has not been fully articulated in Kant's own work. My project here is to examine carefully the Kantian view of the process of character development, in relation to both intelligible character (the rational capacity which is its foundation and guide) and empirical character (character as it develops or fails to develop in the lives of particular human beings). While there is considerable textual material on each dimension of character, Kant wrote little about the relationship between the two. Perhaps he thought that their relationship was simple and clear, as hc implies in the Preface to the second edition of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, where he wrote that the terms virtus phaenomenon and virtus noumenon were only used because they were clearer to philosophers. The matter itself, he wrote, "is contained, I should like to thank Professors Claudia Card and Patrick Riley of the University of Wisconsin and a referee from thisjournal for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Barbara Herman, "The Practice of Moral Judgment," Journal of Philosophy,vol. 82, no. 8 (August 1985): 414-36. [247] 248 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 27:~ APRIL ~989 though in other words, in the most popular children's instruction and sermons , and is easily understood."* However, the relationship between the rational capacity for development of good character and its actualization is not that simple. In particular, when considered from the former perspective, claims about the latter may seem incompatible with basic premises of Kant's theory. Thus Kant holds that every human being, as rational, can recognize the moral law, and this capacity both obligates and enables him to develop a will in which the moral incentive is sovereign. However, when Kant turned his attention toward the actual world, away from the rational Kingdom of Ends, he found many obstacles to that development, not only in human inclinations but in human society. Particularly in Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, but also in his more narrowly political writings, Kant seems to be saying that for certain persons, given their backgrounds, occupations, or social roles, development of good moral character is difficult, if not impossible. If this is true, what, then, becomes of moral causality? Because the development of character seems to provide a natural bridge between the two dimensions, I will examine this process with care. My goal is to provide a normative reconstruction of Kant's theory of character which will show crucial interrelationships between intelligible and empirical character, interrelationships which Kant himself did not spell out with care. 2. THE PROBLEM In the Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals Kant set forth the rational foundations of the development of moral character; in the Doctrine of Virtue he articulated a theory of virtues which a moral agent should develop in order to achieve the two obligatory human ends, one's own perfection and the happiness of others; and in the Religion he further defined good character and forms of evil character. The foundation of good character is the moral causality of the rational agent. If the agent recognizes the moral law, and commits himself firmly to act from respect for the moral law, he has established a sound basis for developing good character. From time to time he may be mistaken in describing his maxim (for...