The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (review)

212 HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY to essences, and it is not the things that have an "objective being" inside the ideas, but only their "essential" contents. This pattern of thought is to be found again in the "essence wing" of American Critical-Realism without any knowledge, of course, about its historical descent. Descartes' attachment to certain traditional patterns of thought does not at all prevent him from being a real discoverer and explorer in the field of consciousness and its immanent reality. An interpreter, however, who is widely influenced by Wittgenstein and Ryle, may scarcely be expected to be an unprejudiced judge of any achievements in this field. Concerning the character of Cartesian thought and writing in general, we may say that Kenny does not take into account to what extent Descartes' philosophy is bound up with the performance of acts or even of actions of philosophizing. This aspect would have been quite important for the interpretation of the "Cogito, ergo sum," the "Cartesian circle," and some other questions treated by Kenny. There is an undeniable tension between certain metaphysical theorems of Descartes and his practice of philosophizing; it is this tension that shows the ambiguity of Descartes' historical position . His doubt, his search for certainty, is, on the one hand, a search for an objective and absolute guarantee of the validity of human knowledge, on the other hand a way of realizing humanself-possession, of arriving at a self-confident state of mind, without further concern for the absolute. In this connection, an obvious violation of a Cartesian text has to be noted ; in his "'Second replies," Descartes does say "'that it does not matter if our intuitions appear false to God or to an angel and are therefore absolutely false" (195). Notwithstanding all these objections, Kenny's Descartes remains a gratifying contribution . Its critical acuteness is always stimulating and refreshing. Perhaps its achievement for the historiography of philosophy is comparatively small. Nevertheless, it is a fresh breeze for present-day discussions about Descartes. WILHELM HALBFASS Gtttingen, Germany The Political Theory o[ Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke. By C. B. McPhersou . (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1962) Although this volume has been in print for seven years, there seems to be little recognition of McPherson's more provocative implications. Indeed McPherson himself does not fully develop his own thesis due to some needless methodological commitments . His narrow theoretical perspective and tangential analysis clouds his book's very significant contribution to the study of Hobbes. McPherson's thesis is, first, that Hobbes (and any other philosopher) must be studied in terms of his contemporary social milieu. Hobbes, to the author, is an intellectual child of the nascent corporate society of England. But McPherson burdens his analysis by stating, second, that Hobbes assumes the possessive market society as the model for his political science. McPherson's claims that he will "show that his [Hobbes's] theory of the necessary relations of man in society requires the assumption of a certain kind of society." Third, Hobbesian social relationships are market-like phenomena, with each individual calculating the gains and losses of his participation in social intercourse. A market perspective of Hobbes's psychology is insightful and offers much ground for fruitful study; it does not, however, necessarily follow from the first two propositions. Market assumptions of social relationships bring to mind the work done by contem- BOOK REVIEWS 213 porary "pure political theorists": Anthony Downs, Kenneth Arrow, James Buchanan, and Gordon Tullock. The belief that Hobbes had to assume the possessive market society as a model for his political science is unjustified and not well supported. Proof of this assumption, according to McPherson, is that Hobbes uses examples of the impossibility of life without fear of a sovereign. This indicates only that Hobbes believed that there are positive benefits that accrue from civil society--of any type. The economic structure of the society has nothing to do with the need for a sovereign; Hobbes said in Leviathan that the need for a sovereign arises from men's invasion of one another for gain, safety, and reputation, which are very general benefits having no unique connection to the possessive market society. The author is led...