The Battle for Leyte, 1944: Allied and Japanese Plans, Preparations, and Execution (review)

Although Leyte in the Philippine Islands is remembered mostly for the naval battles fought there, Dr. Vego has chosen a broader canvas, directing his attention to evaluating the planning, preparation, and execution of the initial Allied invasion of the islands by examining both sides' strategic and operational performance on land, at sea, and in the air. This ambitious and complex task presented him with considerable organizational difficulties and unfortunately his readers will share them. Although the book is well researched, the narrative is at times hard to follow, a task not made easier by the accompanying graphics. None of the place names in the text are cross-referenced to charts, there is little consistency among them, and some are confusingly complicated.

To the Allies (I was glad to note that Dr. Vego recognized the important roles played by Filipinos and Australians in the Leyte campaign), the Philippines were one of several alternative waypoints on the route to Tokyo. The decision to invade the islands rather than Formosa or China's South Coast was, as Dr. Vego points out, largely political. Political too was the failure to unify the two Pacific commands, so that the Pacific Ocean Areas under Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, and South West Pacific Area under General Douglas MacArthur continued to report independently to the Joint Chiefs of Staff with no common superior in the field. The lack of unified command receives appropriate emphasis in the book, and Dr. Vego argues convincingly that this deficiency created serious operational problems and could well have ended in disaster. He notes, too, that, despite the islands' strategic importance, the Japanese command arrangements for the defense of the Philippines were even less unified than those adopted by the Americans.

The Leyte invasion force amounted to over 200,000 men, and the initial landings were successful. Complete recapture of the island, however, took much longer than anticipated due to lack of sufficient inshore naval power to interdict Japanese reinforcements, inadequate minesweeping capabilities, and appalling weather that delayed airfield construction and hindered close air support. However, these factors never really imperiled the invasion. It was the Imperial Japanese Navy's reaction and, more importantly, poor American command decisions, that for a while placed the Leyte beachhead in serious danger.

Dr. Vego describes the Japanese reaction, a complex plan involving three task forces approaching Leyte from different directions, and one Japan based force under Vice Admiral Jisaburu Ozawa whose assignment was to tempt the U.S. Third Fleet under the command of Admiral William F. Halsey away from its mission to provide distant cover for the beachhead. Two of the task forces were decimated during their approach to the island but one, commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Kurita, managed to slip though the San Bernardino Strait to find that Ozawa had done his job well: the beachhead was guarded by only a few ill-protected escort carriers. Had it not been for the extraordinary courage of the escort carriers and their destroyer screens, and the inexplicable decision of Kurita to leave the scene of battle when victory was within his reach, the result might have been an American disaster. Instead, Dr. Vego relates, the naval battles off Leyte effectively eliminated the Japanese Navy as a threat in the Pacific. In desperation the Japanese turned to kamikazes and the book is ominously timely when describing the extraordinary cost effectiveness of tactical suicide.

In addition to narrative, Dr. Vego provides his readers with considerable analysis, and this is persuasive and balanced. Although like most historians he blames Halsey for leaving San Bernardino Strait unguarded, he puts considerable blame on Nimitz, not only for giving Halsey imprecise instructions, but also for not taking charge when it was clear that he was neglecting his primary mission. He notes Halsey's lack of experience in commanding a big carrier fleet...