The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years On: Lessons For the Future (review)

This book contains twenty articles on the Falklands conflict compiled from conferences held in 2002 at the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst and the Royal Naval College at Dartmouth. General topics include the Falklands conflict and history, the conflict in personal memory, worldwide perspectives, and operations in the aftermath of the war. It is a remarkable resource given the fact that it unveils the machinations of one of the most controversial naval battles fought in the twentieth century with an amphibious force, one which precipitated an unmitigated press barrage in Britain.

One outstanding contribution this book makes is that it provides facts overlooked by British television and newspaper reporters in their relentless opposition to the war, facts offered by those who orchestrated the expedition and organized its aftermath. Thus, the reader is privy to details of what succeeded and failed, blow by blow. For example, Britain did not pack enough tents, and we learn that she did not provide enough light antiaircraft weapons, allowing Argentine aircraft to heckle the troops incessantly. She also had to establish a base in the Ascension Islands, four thousand miles from home, because she had closed several relevant bases, including one in Bermuda. In comparison, Argentina's Air Force commander discusses the tactical and strategic weaknesses resulting in his defeat, including the fact that his planes had to return to Argentina to refuel after every sortie.

Of political interest, the Soviet Union often comes in for mention because Britain tied her strategy to that of NATO and developed many of her weapons to counter the Soviets. One scenario was to defend northern Europe, especially northern Norway, against a Soviet attack. These exercises taught the Royal Marines much about bad climates and were useful when applied in the Falklands (p. 246). In addition, the Soviet Union and Cuba played a key role in opposition propaganda, attempting to make the conflict a Cold War item.

While Britain's ill-fated expedition to the Suez Canal in 1956 left a pall over the Falklands expedition (pp. 227–28) and several Commonwealth nations opposed her, Britain's regimental system prevailed: every soldier, imbued with the distinct history and identity of his respective unit, enjoyed high morale and tight unit cohesion which the Argentine draftees could not match. Included are some colorful notes concerning units such as the SAS (equivalent to the U.S. Delta Force), the Royal Marines, the Scots Guards, the Welsh Guards, and the Gurkhas.

Free of jargon and packed with anecdotes, this collection of papers will assist any reader who plans to dig into the Falklands conflict.