The Anglo-Maratha Campaigns and the Contest for India: The struggle for Control of the South Asian Military Economy (review)

For too long, scholars waiting for the book of the subject have had to consult Randolph Cooper's 1992 Cambridge thesis "Cross-Cultural Conflict Analysis: The 'Reality' of British Victory in the Second Anglo-Maratha War, 1803-1805." The surprise about the book is that it contains so much additional material. What is on offer is a study of Maratha military culture, a narrative of what shaped British military attitudes towards the Marathas prior to the 1803 campaigns, a discussion and analysis of these campaigns, and a consideration of explanations for British victory. The latter is of particular importance given the role of these campaigns in meta-narratives of military history. Thus, Geoffrey Parker cited Wellington in support of his argument that the innovations in early-modern European warfare had important implications "for the military balance between the West and the Rest. Time and again, infantry volley fire enabled Western troops to defeat far larger numbers" (Historically Speaking, 4 [4 April 2003]: 13-14).

Cooper will have none of this, not least because he is properly aware of the difficulty of establishing what happened and also its significance. The following indeed is of more general applicability: "In trying to reconstruct the Battle at Laswari it is very difficult to reconcile the conflicting first-person British accounts. A great deal of the problem has to do with fitting the jigsaw puzzle of personal stories and anecdotes together. The lack of a unified perception reflects the limited vision of individuals who were denied an overview of the tactical manoeuvring that took place that day" (p. 201).

To Cooper, the argument for superior British training, discipline, and drill is a military variation on Social Darwinism, and he is critical of those he terms ethnocentric Western analysts, and the technological determinism he detects in the Military Revolution argument. Indeed, Cooper argues that the British lagged behind the Marathas in quality and quantity of artillery, and in artillery doctrine, and, instead, showed a preference for advancing under fire and the use of the bayonet.

The role of British credit in 1803 in the North Indian military labour market is seen as more significant. This meant that no single indigenous power would be able to claim the lion's share of South Asia's military resources. The Maratha War of 1817-19 was largely a mopping-up operation intended to complete the East India Company's expansion of 1803-5 which had been brought to a halt by concern about the costs of the conflict.

Cooper's work is also an instructive response to the simplification (and reification) of methods of warfare in some of the work constituting the "cultural turn" in military history. It is instructive to put the following critique of Wellington alongside glib references to Indian warmaking: "He had misjudged rather substantial parts of the South Asian military environment by seeking to transfer theories from one micro-environment to the subcontinent as a whole" (p. 137).

In short, drawing on a wide reading of British and Indian material, and displaying a commendable ability to understand the different military cultures of the combatants, this important book will not only be the leading work on its subject, but also one of more general interest.