Why Stalin's Soldiers Fought: The Red Army's Effectiveness in World War II (review)

"The Red Army was at all times militarily effective," although it "simultaneously fought quite inefficiently" (306). By "effectiveness," Reese means "the ability of an army to sustain battle" (3). Supported by the public as a whole, Soviet forces performed poorly on many occasions but never lost the ability to fight the Germans.

Soviet citizens served or evaded duty for many reasons. Reese uses published memoirs, archival sources, and recollections available online to show that although some soldiers rejected Stalinism, most fought for the socialist system and for Stalin. Even those who had directly suffered in the prewar years generally did not perceive "evil intent on the part of Stalin or see them [repression, dekulakization, etc.] as inherent to the economic and social systems" (13). Injustices were instead ascribed to Stalin's underlings.

Red Army troops fought because of loyalty to Russia; "normal obedience to the state"; the conviction that resisting the invasion was a "just war"; the belief, especially of young people, that the postrevolutionary generation now faced a great historical task; the understanding that Nazi rule would not improve life; and self-interest, the idea that service might improve one's personal situation (10).

Patriotism did not necessarily equate with support for Stalinist governance; people can and do fight for regimes they dislike. By the same token, surrender or desertion from the Red Army resulted from various motives and situational factors, not always disloyalty. Reese argues that coercion in securing service has been overrated. He details the large number of volunteers from the major cities and compares their willingness to fight to the evaporation of self-sacrifice during World War I. Few Soviet volunteers came from the peasantry, but when the army became "repeasantized" in 1942 after horrendous losses among urban soldiers, the armed forces remained effective.

The book counters ideas—often based on remarks by former German soldiers—that Soviet troops behaved like animals or automatons in battle. Reese shows instead that Soviet soldiers largely acted on their own initiative, deciding for themselves why they fought. Political officers often conducted little indoctrination; rather, they explained to untested men what they should expect in battle. Reese also corrects the record concerning blocking detachments. Contrary to legend, they did not fire machine guns at retreating troops. The detachments were not even designed to intimidate soldiers. Bearing only small arms, they rounded up stragglers and disorganized, retreating men and returned them to the front. The blocking attachments arrested only 3.7 percent of the soldiers that they detained, and only 1.5 percent of the detainees received death sentences (170). The penal battalions, in which casualties could be extremely high, did not mean permanent punishment; service in them sometimes lasted only several days. Survivors usually returned to their original units and ranks. Little evidence suggests that women soldiers and support troops ever failed in action; despite horrendous conditions and sexual harassment, women were "vital" to Soviet success.

Reese could have given more emphasis to German air superiority in 1941/42. The invaders bombed and strafed at will and detected formations approaching the front, greatly damaging Red Army morale and performance. Furthermore, the book can be excessively conceptual. Why divide those who obeyed to "the point of self-sacrifice" into "soldier-philosophers" or "soldier-victims" (131)? When troops were surrounded and bombed, shelled, and cut apart by armor; when they ran out of ammunition, food, and water in the summer heat; no theoretical explanation for surrender is needed. Thankfully, readers can easily cut though this occasional foliage.

Why Stalin's Soldiers Fought makes an excellent contribution to the literature about the Soviet people's response to World War II and Stalinism. Simplistic notions about glorious patriotism or pervasive disloyalty are unhelpful. Reese instead introduces a variety of human motivations, emotions, and responses to the war and to the regime.