Instability and Change in Eastern Europe

Instability and i n Eastern F. Stephen Larrabee Change I I S o m e years ago Charles Gati referred to Eastern Europe as the ”forgotten region.”l While this characterization may have been applicable in the mid-seventies, it is unlikely to remain apt in the 1980s. On the contrary, Eastern Europe is likely to witnessa period of instability and changethat will make it more important, not less, in the calculationsof the two superpowers, and could force Moscow to consider using different and more subtle means for preserving its hegemony in the area than it has used in the past. To some extent this process has already begun. The current unrest in Poland-above all the development of an independent Trade Union Movement -has confronted Moscow with the most serious challenge to its rule in the post-war period and underscored the fragility of its hold on Eastern Europe. If the Polish experiment succeeds, it is likely to have a profound impact on the rest of Eastern Europe, and even on the Soviet Union itself. Indeed developments in Poland may eventually challenge the very basis of Soviet rule in Eastern Europe. The Polish experiment differs from past challenges in several important ways. The Hungarian and Czech upheavals were essentially “revolutions from above,” led by dissident intellectuals and disaffected party members; the Polish experiment represents a broad-based “revolution from below,” led by the workers. In Hungary and Czechoslovakiathe impetus for reform came essentiallyfrom within the party; in Poland today it comesfrom outside the party (although there is increasing grassroots pressure from within the party itself). Whereas Nagy and Dub6ek associated themselves with the drive for reform, Kania has sought to limit it, and where possible, to slow it down. F. Stephen Larrabee was a member of the National Security Council staff responsible for Soviet and Eastern affairs from August 1978 to January 1981. He is currently a Senior Fellow at the Program for Soviet and East European Research at the School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University. 1. Charles Gati, ”The Forgotten Region,” Foreign Policy, Number 19 (Summer 1975), pp. 135145 . Znternational Security, Winter 1981/82(Vol. 6, No. 3) 0162-2889/82/030039-26 $OZ.SO/O 01982 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts lnstitute of Technology. 39 lnternational Security I 40 The repercussions of any major change in Poland for Moscow’s security would be enormous. Poland, the largest and most important country in Eastern Europe, has traditionally acted as a buffer between Moscow and its Western neighbors. A major,changein Poland would remove this buffer and leave the Soviet Union-as well as the German Democratic Republic-exposed . And it would have a major impact on Soviet military strategy in Europe. The Polish Army is the largest and best-equipped of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. It represents a significant increment to Soviet power in Europe and has been earmarked for a rapid offensive role in any conflict with Trouble in Poland would reduce the reliability of the Polish troops and have important consequences for Moscow’s ability to conduct a war in Europe. The unrest in Poland also has important economic implications for the Soviet Union and its East European allies. The countries of Eastern Europe are heavily dependent on Polish coal and semi-finished goods for their industries, and a major disruption of Polish deliveries could cause serious problems, forcing the countries to pay much needed hard currency to buy coal and other goods in the West.3It would also create major difficulties for long-range planning within Comecon (the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, sometimes referred to as CMEA). Changes would have to be made in targets set prior to the unrest in Poland. The revised plans would have to take into account not only Poland’s reduced ability to meet its economic commitments but also the need for increased economic assistance to keep Poland afloat. Moreover, as long as the unrest continues, it is difficult for Comecon planners to predict whether Poland will be able to meet planned production targets in key areas in the future. This is particularly important in the field of...