Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War

Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova’s Civil War I T h e continuing spread of ethnic violence seems set to replace the spread of communism as the central security concern in western capitals. Ethnic wars in Bosnia, Rwanda, Chechnya, and elsewhere frequently dominate the attention of policymakers and publics worldwide, and when top American officials say that ”instability” is the major worldwide threat to American national security, ethnic wars are largely what they have in mind. The impression created by such rhetoric is that ethnic war can happen anywhere, an impression reinforced by the wide range of places where such wars have recently occurred, from Chiapas to Croatia, Iraqi Kurdistan to Sri Lanka. There have been numerous attempts to explain the causes of these ethnic wars. One approach focuses on the role of mass passions or ”ancient hatred” in driving ethnic violence.’ A second theory suggests that inter-ethnic security dilemmas may be the key cause of ethnic war.’ A third approach blames ethnic wars on manipulation by belligerent leaders. However, by focusing on only one cause of conflict-whether hostile masses, belligerent leaders, or the security dilemma-many of these arguments create the false impression that where that one factor is present, ethnic war threatens. They therefore exaggerate the threat of ethnic war. Stuart 1.Kuufman is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of Kentucky The author would like to thank Leokadia Drobizheva, Airat Aklaev, Nicholas Dima, Stephen Bowers, and Vasile Nedelciuc for their help in organizing this research. This research was supported by funds from the University of Kentucky, and by grants from the International Research and Exchanges Board and the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, with funds provided by the US. Department of State (Title VIII) and the National Endowment for the Humanities. Valuable suggestions and advice were provided by Jeff Chinn, Charles Davis, Pal Kolsto, Karen Mingst, and Stephen Saideman. None of these people or organizations is responsible for the views expressed. 1. See, e.g., Robert D. Kaplan, Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History (New York: St. Martin’s, 1993). Some more sophisticated approaches including this argument are Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflict (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Crawford Young, The Politics of Cultural Pludisrn (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1976);and Elizabeth Crighton and Martha Abele MacIver, ”The Evolution of Protracted Ethnic Conflict: Group Dominance and Political Underdevelopment in Northern Ireland and Lebanon,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 23, No. 2 (January 1991),pp. 127-142. 2. Among the first to publish this insight was Barry R. Posen in “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival, Vol. 35, No. 1 (Spring 1993),pp. 2747. International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 19961, pp. lob138 0 1996 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 108 Spiraling to Ethnic War I 209 This article argues that all three factors-hostile masses, belligerent leaders, and inter-ethnic security dilemmas-are necessary if ethnic war is to result. Thesefactorscause ethnic war by reinforcing each other in a spiral of increasing conflict: belligerent leaders stoke mass hostility; hostile masses support belligerent leaders; and both together threaten other groups, creating a security dilemma which in turn encourages even more mass hostility and leadership belligerence. Furthermore, these three factors only emerge if the necessary preconditions are present. The preconditions for mass hostility are a set of ethnicallydefined grievances,negative ethnic stereotypes, and disputes over emotional symbols. Hostility serious enough to motivate ethnic war also requires a fear (usually exaggerated) of ethnic extinction, based on threatening demographic trends and a history of domination by one group over the other. A security dilemma requires that the fears of extinction be mutual-that actions taken by one side to avert extinction be seen by the other side as threatening extinction for themselves. A security dilemma also requires a de facto situation of anarchy and-if it is to lead to war-the military means to enable both sides to fight. Belligerent elites contribute to ethnic conflict through a process of "outbidding ," in which they compete with each other to promote increasingly extreme nationalist positions. For outbidding to be possible, elites require political...