Why the Third World Matters

Why the Third World Matters Steven R. David T h e Third World has been and will remain central to U.S. interests.' The risks of superpower confrontation, of the use of nuclear weapons, and of American or Soviet soldiers engaging in combat are all greater in the Third World than in Europe or Japan. Economic disaster to the United States and its allies is more likely to arise from developments in the Third World than anywhere else. It is in the Third World that the broader receptivity to American goals and values will be determined. In short, the instability and ferment characteristic of the Third World will continue to engage American interests with an urgency and unpredictability unmatched by its so-called "vital" allies. Nevertheless, there is a growing literature arguing that the United Sates exaggerates the importance of the Third World to its interests. Although disputes exist among adherents to this view, there is agreement on several fundamental points. Proponents of this view claim that the Third World does not pose a threat to the vital interests of the United States (defined as the preservation of American security, economic well-being, and core values). Any threat to the limited U.S. interests in the Third World is not so much from the Soviet Union or radical revolutionaries, they argue, but from misguided American policies. By pursuing an aggressive, activist policy the United States will drive Third World regimes into the arms of the Soviets, thus bringing about the outcome it is most seeking to avoid. They argue that the best way for the United States to maintain its interests in the Third World is to pursue an accommodationistpolicy that recognizesits inability to control Third World developments. Above all, the United States must avoid the trap Of the many who provided advice, I would like especially to thank Aaron Friedberg, Stephen Van Evera, Eric Nordlinger, John Mearsheimer, and International Security's anonymousreviewers for their detailed comments. Steven R. David is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at The Johns Hopkins University. 1. I have defined the "Third World" to include all countries except the USSR, the United States, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, the European states, and the People's Republic of China. International Security, Summer 1989 (Vol. 14, No. 1) 0 1989by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. 50 Why the Third World Mutters I51 of squandering scarce resources on peripheral Third World interests while truly vital concerns receive inadequate attention.2 These analysts, whom I will call "hyper-realists," have provided a service in forcing the explicit consideration of just what is and is not important in the Third World, and how American policy can best secure U.S. interest^.^ Moreover, the hyper-realists are correct in arguing that the United States must give top priority to its own protection and the protection of its Western European and Japanese allies. But this does not require an abandonment of American interests and commitments in the Third World such as the hyperrealist approach would bring about. This is all the more true because an engaged American policy in the Third World can be carried out at a reasonable cost without requiring the protracted use of American personnel abroad. The United States cannot allow fears of threats that almost certainly will never materialize to prevent us from dealing with Third World threats that already exist, and the far more serious challenges to American interests that are likely to develop in the future. My argument is put forth in three parts. First, I review some of the principal assertions of those who believe the United Statesexaggeratesthe importance of the Third World and should play a less active role in trying to determine the outcome of developments there. Second, I explain why their assertions are incorrect or are themselves exaggerated, and why the United Statesneeds to be actively involved in attempting to influence the course of Third World ~~~~~~ ~ ~ 2. The "school" of thought that this article addresses is derived principally from the following pieces of work Robert H. Johnson, "Exaggerating America's Stakes in Third World Conflicts," International Security...