Editors' Note

Editors’ Note A consensus has emerged that the U .S. defense budget is unlikely togrow fast enough tofund currently planned programs. Many analysts agree that the Bush administration will be forced to make difficult choices between new weapons systems and maintaining the readiness of existing forces. International Security has therefore invited several experts to present their perspectives on the fiscal and strategic dimensions of the coming defense budget crunch. Gordon Adams and Stephen Alexis Cain of the Defense Budget Project at the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities offer an overview of the present defense budget dilemma. After noting that the Reagan administration’s emphasis on procurement of new weapons systems has driven up the investment portion of the defense budget, they argue that weapons modernization plans must be curtailed so that military readiness and sustainability do not bear the brunt of any budget cuts. Reductions in the U.S.force structure may be necessary, but they should be contemplated only after a careful study of military missions and strategies. Former Deputy Secretary of Defense Robert Ellsworth argues that changes in Soviet foreign policy have combined with fiscal realities to produce new challengesfor defense policy. Nevertheless, he suggests that maintaining the defense budget at its current level in real terms will enable the United States to make necessary improvements in American military capabilities. Ellsworth sees potential savings from moving several Air Force and Army units from active to reserve status, operating aircraft carriers closer to the United States, closing some military bases, and upgrading present systems with new technology insfeud of procuring new platforms. Modernization programs in the areasof strategic command and control, reducing ICBM vulnerability, and airlift and sealift should, however, continue or be expanded. Cindy Williams of the MITRE Corporation examines that part of the defense budget devoted to strategic nuclear forces. She discounts several myths about strategic spending , including the notion that delaying new lCBM deployments is tantamount to unilateral disarmament, and that the proposed first phase of SDl will defend population centers. Williams concludes that even without funding new programs, such as Midgetman, some cuts in existing programs will probably be required unless strategic programs are to claim a larger share of the budget. International Security has devoted considerable attention to problems of assessing the conventional balance of forces in Europe. Previous articles have generated both interest and controversy. A contintling dialogue among analysts of divergent views Intrrnationai Security, Spring 1989 (Val. 13, No. 4) 0 1989by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology 3 International Security 13:4 [ 4 has emerged. Because the question of the European balance not only is important in its own right, but also raises important methodological questions of net assessment and combat modeling, this issue of International Security contains several exchanges on measuring the balance in Europe and on net assessment more generally. In articles that build upon their previous contributions to these pages, JohnMearsheimer of the University of Chicago and Joshua Epstein of the Brookings Institution debate the efficacy of alternative approaches to theater-level net assessment. Mearsheimer , responding to Epstein's Spring 1988International Security article, argues that the 3:1 rule, which posits that attacking forces need a 3:l advantage over defenders, offers a useful method of analyzing breakthrough battles. He also contends that mathematical models of combat, suck as Epstein's Adaptive Dynamic Model, suffer from a number of important inherent paws. International Security offered Epstein the opportunity to reply to Mearsheimer's article. He writes that the 3:1 rule is unscientific and that Mearsheimer has not stated the rule so that it can be tested rigorously. He argues that his Adaptive Dynamic Model and dynamic analysis in general offer a more promising direction for the future of international security studies. In our correspondence section, Barry Posen and John Mearsheimer comment upon Eliot Cohen's Summer 1988article, "Toward Better Net Assessment: Rethinking the European Conventional Balance,' I and Cohen offers his reply. Finally, focusing on a key aspect of the European balance, Steven Zaloga presents a critique of "Is There a Tank Gap? Comparing NATO and Warsaw Pact Tank Fleets" (Summer 1988), and Malcolm Chalmers and Lutz Unterseher...