The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama (review)

122 China Review International: Vol. 6, No. i, Spring 1999 ship makes threatening statements or when American intelligence detects any possible PLA preparation for the use offorce in the Taiwan Strait. John Garver is to be commended for producing an excellent in-depth analysis of the 1996 crisis. Academicians, policy makers, and the general public will enjoy reading this book as it illuminates the impact of the political dynamics on foreign policy decisions within China, the United States, and Taiwan that gave rise to the 1996 crisis. Garver differentiates between Chinese "anti-hegemonist conservatives " and the "realpolitik mainstream" and shows not only that the PRC leadership is not monolithic, but that whatever point ofview prevails in Beijing is of enormous consequence. Moreover, Garver also raises thought-provoking policy issues with regard to China and Taiwan, challenging American policy makers to define U.S. policy interests in Taiwan clearly and think through the problem of how to cope with a rising China. Parris H. Chang Pennsylvania State University Parris H. Chang is a professor emeritus ofpolitical science and President ofthe Taiwan Institute ofPolitical, Economic and Strategic Studies, and concurrently a member ofTaiwan's Legislative Yuan (Parliament). mm Melvyn C. Goldstein. The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press, 1997. xiii, 152 pp. Hardcover $19.95, ISBN 520-21254-1. In recent years the Tibet Question, that is, the issue ofthe political status ofTibet vis-à-vis China, has emerged at the forefront ofAmerican culture and politics. Both specialists and novices interested in this issue, as well as watchers ofcontemporary China, will find Melvyn Goldstein's The Snow Lion and the Dragon an invaluable, but not incontrovertible, resource. In this concise monograph Goldstein skillfully explains the history ofthe Tibet Question, critically analyzes the contemporary motivations and intentions ofkey figures in both Beijing and Dharamsala, and boldly offers a peaceful solution to a question that has plagued 1 " China's internal and external relations, brought undue suffering to all Tibetans, and is threatening Tibetan culture with irrevocable change. By dividing the body ofhis text into discrete sections, Goldstein suggests that Sino-Tibetan relations have existed in five distinct forms. In section one, "The ofHawai'i Press Reviews 123 Imperial Era" (which he leaves undefined), Goldstein asserts that "Tibet was in no way subordinate to China," and that "each was a distinct and independent political entity" (p. 1). While this assertion is generally accurate, substantial evidence exists suggesting some degree ofpolitical suzerainty over Tibet by the Mongols and the Manchus, two non-Han ethnic groups who maintained dynastic rule over China. Striving to present history in a fair and balanced manner, Goldstein qualifies his broad assertion by discussing this suzerainty in terms of a system of "passive hegemony" that was created by Qing (Manchu) emperors to exert their influence in Tibet, while also emphasizing that actual Chinese influence there varied dramatically during the Qing dynasty (1644-1912). Having dealt in great depth with Tibet's period of de facto independence from China following the fall of the Qing elsewhere,1 Goldstein briefly summarizes in section two die crucial period from 1912 to 1949 during which Tibet managed its affairs free from any Chinese influence. Here Goldstein highlights the importance of the failed Simla Convention in shaping our contemporary understanding of the Tibet Question as a conflict over the de jure political status of Tibet vis-à-vis China, as well as the development ofthe "bad-friend syndrome" between Tibet and various Western powers. In his discussion ofthe third phase of Sino-Tibetan relations, Goldstein cogently analyzes the circumstances surrounding the development ofthe first formal written agreement between China and Tibet acknowledging the sovereignly of the former over the latter—the Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation ofTibet. In so doing he dispels the common misunderstanding in the West that radical Maoist reforms began in Tibet immediately following the signing ofthis agreement by pointing out that Mao, at least initially, adopted a policy of "gradualism" with regard to reform in Tibet. Moreover, Goldstein lucidly shows how the failure of this policy was due both to overzealous Chinese socialist reformers and competing forces in...