Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism: Lessons of the Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union

6. CONSTITUTIONAL OPENING AND CLOSURE: JUMBE’S DOWNFALL (1979–1985)

Chapter Six CONSTITUTIONAL OPENING AND CLOSURE: JUMBE’S DOWNFALL (1979–1985) CONSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATION The foundation of the 1977 Constitution was the Party whose supremacy and ultimate authority pervaded the whole constitutional structure. The constitutional edifice stood on a tripod: oneparty supremacy, the two-government Union and the ‘imperial’ presidency. Since 1962 when the republican constitution of Tanganyika adopted executive presidency, powers were increasingly concentrated in the executive on the one hand and within the executive in the president, on the other.1 Since the chairman of the party is invariably the president of the republic, single-party supremacy further enhanced the powers of the imperial presidency. Nyerere used his ‘two hats’ cleverly as circumstances demanded. In spite of his misgivings on party supremacy,2 Jumbe believed that he could take advantage of the two-government structure to 181 1 See, generally, articles in the ‘Special Issue on the Constitution and the State in Tanzania’ Eastern Africa Law Review, vol. 11–14, 1978–1981, and Shivji ed. 1985/1986. 2 While the debate on merging of the parties was raging, Jumbe in his address to the ASP National Executive Council on 15th June 1976 made this poignant observation: The framers of the Interim Constitution whilst contemplating that there shall ultimately be one political party by the union of the two Parties in the respective territories of Tanganyika and Zanzibar took care to provide preserve Zanzibar’s autonomy. Nyerere on the other hand banked on party supremacy to control and restrict the autonomy of Zanzibar’s government. Soon after the merger, Jumbe continued his strategy to separate the organs of the government from the party. However, he had to fight his battle on two fronts: against Karume hardliners internally and the insatiable appetite of the Union to absorb Zanzibar, externally. His strategy seems to have been to separate Zanzibar government organs from the party as much as possible and democratise the government without himself losing power. He could not possibly strengthen the government organs without at the same time separating the government from the Revolutionary Council, the bastion of Karume hardliners. The result was to introduce limited democratic reforms, while at the same time centralise powers in himself as the president of Zanzibar 182 Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? that the political activity of the Party was not to include the organs of the state of the United Republic and the organs of the Executive and Legislature for Zanzibar. The idea underlying this stand, which was emphasized by this provision, was that the two sovereign territories had come together on the basis of a certain understanding which provides for safeguard of mutual interests. From the point of view of Zanzibar, one of its main interests which was assured to be protected was with regard to the state organs of the Union, because they have certain functions with regard to Union matters over Zanzibar, and the sovereignty of Zanzibar in all matters other than Union matters must remain the concern of Zanzibar. The amendments carried out in June 1975 [which introduced supremacy of the Party I.G.] however, made a considerable difference to the position (of Zanzibar) because the functions of all Organs of State of the United Republic would now have to be performed under the supervision and control of the Party and all political activity in Tanzania to be conducted by or under the supervision of the Party as well as the functions of all organs of the Government and the law making process. This makes the competence of the single party with regard to political activity without any limit and may even embrace changes which may affect the essential interests of Zanzibar. This was an eventuality which all the members of the ASP acting through the Party’s organs, wished to avoid at all cost. (Quoted in Jumbe 1994: p. 74–75.) In spite of this clear understanding of the implication of party supremacy, he went along the process of merger. (For discussion, see chapter 5). 183 Constitutional Opening and Closure: Jumbe's Downfall and chairman of the Revolutionary Council. This resulted ultimately in the adoption of the 1979 constitution, which was the first constitution of Zanzibar after the revolution. We examine the process of restructuring government organs in the immediate postmerger period below. RESTRUCTURING THE GOVERNMENT Revolutionary committees Even before CCM was formally launched on 5th February 1977, Zanzibar enacted the Revolutionary Committees Decree No. 1 of 1977...