Studying Singapore's Past: C.M. Turnbull and the History of Modern Singapore

Chapter 7: Reappraising the Aftermath of War: The Problems of the British Military Administration and Singapore's Place in the Changing Strategic Environment of Empire, 1945-1946

146 Kelvin W.K. Ng 7 ~ Reappraising the Aftermath of War: The Problems of the British Military Administration and Singapore’s Place in the Changing Strategic Environment of Empire, 1945–1946 1 Kelvin W.K. Ng A Problematic Epilogue to the Far Eastern War WRITING ON THE BRITISH MILITARY ADMINISTRATION (BMA) in A History of Modern Singapore, 1819–2005, Mary Turnbull observes: In its seven months it destroyed the goodwill that existed at the time of liberation and brought British prestige in Singapore to an even lower point than in February 1942.2 Turnbull’s claim is a bold one. The disastrous Malayan campaign of 1941–1942 which culminated in the surrender of Singapore and a 130,000-strong imperial field army represented a catastrophe of British arms not seen since Yorktown, and left a stain on British military prestige 146 Reappraising the Aftermath of War 147 that even the spectacular run of victories in Burma during 1944–1945 could not erase.3 Since the tide of war turned in the Far East, British politicians and military commanders had been spoiling for a dramatic Overlord-style re-invasion of Malaya, which alone, they believed, could redeem the failures of 1942. The sudden death of the Japanese Empire in the ruins of Hiroshima and Nagasaki denied them the battlefield achievement that they assumed would restore the image of British rule in the eyes of their Malayan subject peoples. If one is to accept Turnbull’s assertion , the seven months of post-war military government that came in place of a hard fought campaign of liberation dealt an even harder blow to the British Empire than the collapse of its armies in 1942, and severely compromised the re-imposition of colonial authority. The BMA assumed the government of Singapore and Malaya upon the return of British Empire forces in September 1945 and lasted till the handover to civilian rule on 1 April 1946. Its mission was the political stabilisation and economic resuscitation of these once prosperous territories , so vital to Britain’s post-war fortunes. But it was an administration fraught with problems whose legacies undoubtedly paved the way for the Communist Emergency and the bitter post-war experience of radical and racial politics. Yet its significance is obscured by a problematic historiography that overlooks some of the important issues of this episode. This epilogue to the Far Eastern campaigns occupies an understandably marginal place in the historiography of the Second World War, the British Empire’s last years, and the postcolonial histories of its successor states. The brief moment of military rule was overshadowed by more dramatic developments: Field Marshal Slim’s sweep through Burma; the atom bombs; the Communist Emergency; the independence of Malaya and Singapore. Allied triumphalism regarded it as a successful postscript to the war against Japan.4 Alternatively, it appeared as a small chapter in the story of progressive Malayan nationhood.5 But by the later 1960s, when the turbulent secession of Singapore from the Federation, intensifying communal violence, Indonesian aggression and an escalating war in Vietnam made the entire post-war British enterprise in the region seem prodigal and vain, the tone of writing changed. Rudner’s 1968 article “The Organisation of the BMA” presented a scathing attack on the BMA, in particular the rampant black marketeering and corruption, a posture which was similarly adopted by subsequent historians.6 For instance, the Andayas’ A History of Malaysia depicts an impotent military government reliant on communist assistance to restore law and order,7 while Turnbull 148 Kelvin W.K. Ng emphasises the “false hopes [and] disappointments” of the period, noting its widespread poverty and unemployment.8 The problems in the historiography are evident. The assessment of the BMA has been overwhelmingly concerned with political and civil affairs, a natural focus given the BMA’s mission but one that neglects important issues. The BMA was essentially a military organisation operating along military lines. Operational factors therefore governed the BMA’s conduct of its civil affairs duties, and were crucial to post-war problems and their long-term repercussions, while the changing strategic environment threw up dilemmas which further complicated the BMA’s mission. Approaching this topic from a more overtly military angle is a task long overdue. Since the Official History, little has been written about this. Murfett’s military history of Singapore, Between Two Oceans, only briefly alludes to the re...