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131 Chapter Five: Consequences of the Bambili and Babanki-Tungoh Boundary Conflict sell their cattle. In as much as the government was concerned, the inability of the Fulanis to sell their cattle meant a reduction in the jangili tax, hence national income.11 C) Political Consequences Politically, the boundary conflict exposed the weaknesses or the inability of the administration to solve the boundary conflict. The Fon of Babanki-Tungoh who signed the 1973 accord not call on his people to stop their activities on the disputed area was agreed to by both parties. Yet, neither him nor the people involved were penalised. This certainly gave the impression that the accord was not considered serious by the government. The weaknesses of the civil administration were further shown by the fact that the administration did not understand the historicity of the boundary conflict. Following an interview in the Cameroon Tribune, Bell Luc Rene said: I have said it over and over that the solution to this problem is not exclusively that of the administration. It concerns all of us. All of the disputes are old. For example, the Bambili/ Babanki-Tungoh case was resolved in 1958 by the colonial master. The real problem lies in the implementation of the decision taken at that time. The people are not helping the administration to solve this problem. I am only there to help. I am not a native of the North West Province and do not know the boundaries. I cannot sway from decisions taken before or be expected to work on empty files12 . Certain points could be deduced from the above quotation. Firstly, that 1958 was pronounced as being the year which gave a final solution to the Bambili and Babanki-Tungoh boundary conflict seems to portray the ignorance of the administration. This was because before the 1958 decision was taken by the colonial administrators had been pre-occupied since 1953. In that year, Ward, the Colonial resident in Bamenda attempted a solution. Five years later, in 1958, his successor A. B. Westmacott modified Ward’s attempted solution. Owing to the fact that British Southern Cameroons gained independence in October 1961 through reunification, the British colonial administrators were obliged to 132 Sons and Daughters of the Soil quit the territory. Since the attempted solution of the boundary misunderstanding appeared a continuum since 1953, one expected the Cameroon administration manned by Cameroonians to better handle this issue. What was more surprising and interesting is that Bell Luc Rene knew and recognised the fact that the 1958 decision solved the problem in “name and not in fact only” because “[T]he real problem lies with implementation”. The crux of the problem now is who should implement the 1958 decision? In as much as the civil administration fails to accomplish this decision, it is tempting to say that, she remains at best weak. As if that was not enough, the second pertinent point is the refusal of the Governor willy-nilly, that he is not a native of Bamenda and therefore should not know boundaries. As the highest ranking civil administrator in the region, his statement was unfortunate. Closely related to the weakness of the civil administration was the corrupt nature of some civil and/or legal administrators. According to letter, Ref. No. ABA/102/50 of March 1, 1970, the two villages were anxious to know what became of the deposits of 138,400 francs paid by each side in the case. It is further confirmed in the letter that the Bambili community paid the above sum of Receipts No. 81/242331 of 11 April 1963 and 41/242959 of 13 July 1963.13 The letter however expresses worries about the accountability of this money. It is not easy to establish the fact that this money was embezzled. However, the letter issued by the Senior Divisional Officer of Mezam, H.P. Sone, of April 20, 1971 dismissed any phrases aimed at discrediting the administration. Amongst other things, the letter read “... These statements are meant only to discredit the Administration and also to indicate your unwillingness to abide by the decision of Dr. J.N. Foncha then Prime Minister of West Cameroon”....18 The Babanki-Tungoh people are portrayed as more aggressive than their Bambili enemies. In order to support this fact it is worth examining three letters which were written to the Senior Divisional Officer in Bamenda by the Bambili elites. In the letter, Ref. No. E290/102/S.9/74 of October 13, 1980...

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