In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

7 Hawks and doves within the British government in handling the disturbances While the Hong Kong and British governments shared the consensus of standing firm against the leftist-inspired disturbances, there were subtle differences in the approach adopted by the Hong Kong government and that adopted by London and British diplomats in Beijing. The differences in their interpretation of the situations were also notable at times. While Governor David Trench adopted an aggressive and provocative stance towards local leftists, London and British diplomats in Beijing were sometimes more circumspect than the governor in assessing the situation in the colony and handling of the disturbances. The different considerations of the governor, Commonwealth Office officials and British diplomats in Beijing gave rise to a subtle tripartite relationship among the three parties during the disturbances. Trench was adamant that the disturbances were initiated by the left wing in Hong Kong and Beijing only played a passive role, such as giving propaganda support. He believed that the leftist camp felt that they must act in Hong Kong to keep in line with the prevailing “revolutionary thoughts” during the Cultural Revolution and that the confrontation did not arise from the policy deliberately directed by Beijing. In a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on May 13, he said that “there is no evidence at present to suggest that the C.P.G. had changed its policy towards Hong Kong or desires to ‘rock the boat’ ”. Based on such an assessment, Trench stood firm and did not hesitate to quell the disturbances and press London to endorse his tough stance. In a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on May 13, Trench said that he was pondering over the possibility of prosecuting Wen Wei Po and Ta Kung Pao for their “seditious” reports and commentaries and had sought legal opinion on it. “It seems inevitable that an attempt to prosecute or suppress these left-wing newspapers would result in formal protests from Peking . . . On the other hand, I am likely to be under increasing pressure from responsible local opinion and from the right-wing press to do something positive to preserve public confidence and to support the police,” he wrote.1 “I am reluctant to take overt action against the left-wing press since it would involve a direct confrontation from which retreat on either side would be very Cheung_07_ch07.indd 101 19/04/2011 4:06 PM 102 Hong Kong’s Watershed difficult. Equally, there are limits to what can be tolerated without risk of an irretrievable loss of public confidence and abdication of authority on Macau line,” Trench wrote. Trench believed that a prolonged crisis would be the “worst of all possible situations for Hong Kong”. In a telegram to the Commonwealth Office on May 13, he said that “for the time being I shall concentrate on trying to hold the present situation in Kowloon while seeking to reach some understanding with the Left that would eliminate the present disorder”.2 He believed there was a chance that by taking a very firm line, there might be some prospect of inducing a change of the mainland authorities’ attitude which would enable both sides to disengage from confrontation. London was, however, more cautious in handling the confrontation and strived to avoid unnecessary provocation. In a telegram to the governor on May 17, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs Herbert Bowden said: “Our policy must be to continue to deal firmly with any disorders which the communists may try to instigate, but at the same time to avoid so far as possible action which would be regarded as unnecessarily provocative.” Bowden wrote, “while continuing to show our firmness in maintaining law and order, we must maintain contact with the left wing with a view to making clear to them that we are not prepared to face a Macau-type compromise.”3 In order to avoid “unnecessary provocation”, Bowden said it would be wise to avoid prosecution against the pro-Communist press for sedition, which was usually difficult to prove and generally provided considerable opportunities for propaganda. “The actual measures to be taken to deal with the situation at any given time must continue to be a matter of ‘most careful judgment’,” he said. The more measured approach adopted by the British government was underlined by the importance London attached to preserving Sino-British relationship. Britain was the first major Western power which recognized the People’s Republic of China. After her recognition of the People’s Republic in...

Share