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119 5 THE SOCIOLOGY OF UMMAT ISLAM Structure and Anti-structure Nowadays anybody can become any kind of person (siapa-siapa bisa menjadi apa-apa saja). The main point is how one behaves; like priyayi (berpriyayi), like santri (bersantri), or like abangan (berabangan). It is ber, ber, ber (“doings”) that makes the difference. (Interview with Kyai Haji Masjhudi, 2 November 1971). The Muhammadiyah movement was characterized by its non-political stance from the outset as we have seen above (Chapter 3, p. 73). Besides the factor of circumspect avoidance of government repressions of “Muslim fanatics”, the position was a manifestation of the high value placed by the movement on an individual Muslim’s personal faith which could uphold self-reliant and independent Muslim life under any political condition. The achievement of religious devotion was regarded as a matter lying within the range of an individual’s personal control in whatever situation. A religious community composed of such individuals could transcend any particular forms of secular polity. Throughout the Dutch period, the Muhammadiyah’s stance towards the colonial government was rather passive and defensive; if the government interfered with Islamic matters, it certainly reacted to defend its interests with full strength, but otherwise it took no political initiatives of its own. Formation of or affiliation with political organizations was completely left to 120 The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree individual choice.1 Towards the latter half of the 1930s, an Islamic political party, Partai Islam Indonesia (PII), closely connected with the Muhammadiyah, was formed. However, the party’s role was a “diplomatic” representation, i.e., negotiations with the colonial government and other secular political parties for the defence of Islamic interests.2 The basic non-political position of the Muhammadiyah helped to maintain a stable condition favourable for the steady growth of its membership and the establishment of educational and social welfare institutions. THE POST-WAr POLITICAL DEvELOPMEnT Conventionally, the history of Indonesian politics in the next two decades (1940s–1950s) has been viewed as a history of the failure of Muslims’ political attempt at making independent Indonesia an Islamic state. Under the Japanese occupation authorities, Muslim political forces acquired organizational strength and a stature in national politics comparable to that of civil servants and secular nationalists. In post-Independence politics, Muslim political parties were strong enough to keep playing a dominant role in successive coalition governments, but not strong enough to realize their goal of an Islamic state through parliamentary means.The insufficient strength of the Muslim political parties for their claim to power was typically shown by the results of the first general elections held in 1955 in which they failed to obtain a majority in spite of the fact that approximately 90 per cent of Indonesians professed to be Muslims. No other political parties did secure a majority either, and the Constitutional Assembly came to a stalemate over the issue of the foundation of the state. The Muslim frustrations found an outlet in a number of local armed revolts culminating into large-scale rebellions in cooperation with regionalist military officers in the major outer islands. With the defeat of these rebellions and the suspension of parliamentary democracy, however, Muslim political parties were largely incapacitated, and forced into cooperation with Sukarno’s Guided Democracy or simply banned. The Java-based traditionalist Muslim party, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), took the first course, and the outer islands-based reformists, the Masyumi Party, the latter. The Muhammadiyah, by appealing to the personal favour of President Sukarno (who once taught at a Muhammadiyah school while he was in exile in Bengkulu, Sumatra, in the late 1930s), barely escaped the government repression. 1. For an interesting discussion on the relationship between religion and politics by a Muhammadiyah leader in the early 1930s, see Mahfoeld (1933). 2. For more on this short-lived Islamic party, see Deliar (1973, pp. 158–61). [18.116.90.141] Project MUSE (2024-04-26 05:52 GMT) The Sociology of Ummat Islam 121 As a political analysis, the foregoing conventional view seems to present no problem. However, in a wider perspective of the relationship between religion and politics, the view poses more questions than answers. A central question to be asked is whether it is appropriate to regard Muslim political forces as having contended for power in competition with secular political forces in the same terms as suggested by Harry Benda (1958, p. 203; 1965, p. 131). When I entered Kotagede and first met some of the former...

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