Asian Security Reassessed

7. Weapons Proliferation in Asia

Weapons Proliferation in Asia 171 Chapter Seven Weapons Proliferation in Asia Rod Lyon INTRODUCTION Any reassessment of the changing Asian security environment must allow considerable space for the large, unresolved issues of earlier years. Despite the rush of new issues onto the Asian security agenda, at the core of many regional security problems still lies a continuing worry about an old issue: Weapons proliferation. Indeed, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now appears more worrying than before, precisely because of the change in the nature of war-making units that the events of September 11 have advertised,1 and the new determination in Washington to act forcefully, and if necessary pre-emptively, to prevent terrorists from acquiring such weapons. Further, WMD remain a major concern of analysts studying the traditional state-centric balance of power in the region. Such concerns are replicated, albeit at a lower level, in relation to the steady accumulation and qualitative improvement of conventional forces in the region. In short, the Asia-Pacific remains an area where regional institutionalization is under-developed, cross-border tensions are comparatively high, weapons capabilities are increasing, and the complex 07 Asian Security Ch 7.pm65 6/12/06, 2:39 PM 171 172 Rod Lyon issues of WMD proliferation have not been solved. In this chapter, I will examine the issues surrounding both nuclear and conventional proliferation, by focusing on the North Korean nuclear issue and China’s conventional force modernization. THE TWO CHESSBOARDS Since the dramatic events of 11 September 2001, it has become clear that international security is now most appropriately depicted not as one “grand chessboard”2 but as two interlinked chessboards. Up on the top board exist those state-centric actors who have traditionally monopolized the field of international security, and all their related concerns. On the top chessboard, the principal concern is to check great power conflict, for the simple reason that great-power wars can be incredibly destructive. On that top chessboard, we have developed, essentially since the age of Napoleon, a set of mechanisms for managing that concern, such as powerbalancing , diplomacy, arms control and deterrence. Further, unipolarity suggests the basic problems of the top chessboard are currently held in check by U.S. “hyperpower”.3 Still, even a hyperpower has its limits, and the phenomenon of hyperpowerdom is itself so unusual in international relations that it might be wise to suspend judgment on whether it is stabilizing or not until further evidence is available. But since 11 September 2001, the international community has been focusing much more sharply upon the lower chessboard. On this board, the actors are characteristically less powerful, and include the weak states, pariah states, rogue states, and non-state actors such as transnational criminals and terrorists. On the lower chessboard, the mechanisms we use to control the top chessboard do not work nearly so well. A major focus of current effort is to discern and develop mechanisms appropriate to the sort of threats found there. The National Security Strategy of the Bush administration constitutes one such attempt to address the lower chessboard security threats, albeit a controversial one that places a high emphasis on the proactive engagement of possible threats, including through the use of military power. Such action has been justified by President Bush and others as the lesser of two evils, the greater evil resulting from a policy of inaction which would allow the gradual acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by the sorts of states which might see advantage in the transfer of such capabilities to terrorists. Still, the strategy is contentious and, as the Iraq case amply demonstrates, difficult to apply. Envisaging how a strategy 07 Asian Security Ch 7.pm65 6/12/06, 2:39 PM 172 Weapons Proliferation in Asia 173 of pre-emption might be used against lower-chessboard proliferants in the Asia-Pacific produces some worrying scenarios. THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is not a new problem in international security. Rather, it is a problem that has long been of particular concern to diplomats and strategists precisely because of the unique problems it poses for international stability. In the days of the Cold War, “vertical” proliferation — the steady increase in the size of WMD arsenals by states which had already crossed the threshold — was a much more common occurrence than “horizontal” proliferation — the acquisition of WMD by states crossing...