China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian

6. Conclusion

117 Conclusion© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore Taiwan missed the best opportunity to cement a favourable and peaceful crossstrait arrangement in the late 1980s and the early 1990s when Beijing was most eager to make huge concessions. As discussed earlier, Lee Teng-hui misperceived and mismanaged this opportunity. Most likely, he never had the intention to negotiate for anything that would lead to reunification. Now, Beijing is no longer in a hurry to make concessions. One reason is that their bitter experience with Lee Teng-hui tells loudly that “sweeteners” at this moment will not work out with Taipei. As Chinese President Jiang Zemin summed up in August 2000, “an important lesson to be learnt from the failure in our work towards Taiwan, which saw a deterioration from one China to two Chinas, is that only until we are fully prepared to reclaim it by force would there be a chance for peaceful reunification”.1 Chen Shui-bian’s election as President on 18 March 2000 has brought about severe political, economic and social dislocations in Taiwan. Beijing has adjusted its Taiwan policy accordingly. It resorts to both well-calculated pressure (on the DPP) and concessions (to the opposition), in the hope that the current political, economic and social disruptions in Taiwan would emasculate the DPP’s will and capability for independence. By using political and economic “pincers”, as discussed above, China has the confidence to solve the Taiwan problem gradually but eventually. Force mainly serves as a deterrence against potential radical moves towards Taiwan independence. The earlier discussion on the PLA’s modernization demonstrates that it is now emphasizing on its strike capability rather than on its power projection capability. For example, it stresses the development of missiles rather than air and sea lift capability that is essential for a full invasion of Taiwan. This tells that China wants to deter Taiwan from any radical push for independence, but is not planning a full invasion. Such a full invasion would be China’s “Vietnam”. To Beijing, reunification is a means to make China stronger, but not to exhaust itself through a war. 6 Conclusion Reproduced from China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian by Sheng Lijun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 118 China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian© 2002 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore This deterrence also serves as a catalyst, in co-operation with the political and economic “pincers”, for favourable political and economic chain-reactions inside Taiwan. That is why stern warnings were issued from Beijing and exercises conducted by the PLA near the Taiwan coast (but not a war), often at a critical moment in Taiwan’s internal politics. These have been very cost-effective means employed by Beijing to manipulate Taiwan’s political and economic environment. One huge price Taiwan has been paying and will continue to pay is the erosion of its business environment, on which rests domestic and international investment confidence, and consequently the prospects for Taiwan’s economy in future. This environment will not improve significantly as long as tension exists across the strait. If Taiwan eventually loses the economic competition with China, its current pushes for independence will be viewed by future generations as not only meaningless but also disastrous to Taiwan’s longterm interests. Its current huge arms purchase would appear as a costly “white elephant” that siphoned resources that should otherwise have been used to upgrade Taiwan’s economic structure. In this perspective, the low intensity tension, short of war, serves Beijing’s interests if reunification cannot be obtained now. Thus, the “uncomfortable peace”, although a Cold War-style one, over the Taiwan Strait will remain for at least the near future. A war across the strait is less likely if China believes that time is on its side. This Chinese confidence is enhanced by Taiwan’s current political and economic deterioration, for which the DPP should be blamed in large part, though not all. Although the current international economic slowdown is not Taipei’s fault, the ruling DPP is certainly to blame for its poor handling. Will Taiwan bounce back...