China's Dilemma: The Taiwan Issue

7. Taiwan after the Face-Off

Part III: China vs. Taiwan 130© 2001 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 7 Taiwan after the Face-Off After the face-off between Beijing and Taipei in 1995, Lee took a tit-for-tat stance in defiance of China’s mounting pressure, which, together with the changes in Taiwan’s mainland policy, will be presented in this chapter. The rationale behind this stance will be discussed in Chapter 9. “Go Nuclear”? Lee’s initial tit-for-tat reactions included the threat to “go nuclear”. Following China’s harsh actions, the phrase “go nuclear” was spread around Taiwan. At one National Assembly session in late July 1995, the question was raised for Lee to clarify. Lee did not give a clear denial. He answered: “We should restudy the question (of acquiring nuclear weapons) from a long-term point of view”.1 This answer received a sharp response. The Taiwan government then quickly denied that it had any plan for developing nuclear weapons. Its explanation was that “What Mr. Lee meant by ‘long-term point of view’ was actually to give the matter further thought and discuss it later. In other words, it was an implicit way of saying ‘no’”.2 This explanation was weak given the fact that Taiwan did have such a programme up until the late 1980s. Suspicions were aroused again following Lien Chan’s secret visit to Ukraine in August 1996 when it was reported, although denied by Taiwan, that Lien discussed the nuclear issue with officials in Ukraine. The United States once forced Taiwan to drop the Pegasus Project for mid-range missiles out of the concern that Taiwan would initiate an offensive against China, as the U.S. deal with China was not to sell Taiwan offensive weapons that could hit the mainland. However, it was reported that Taiwan was on the verge of testing its mid-range surface-to-surface missiles. According to Taiwan’s China Times, the range of the missile was 300 kilometres (186 miles), ISEAS D OCUMENT DELIVER Y SERVICE . No reproduction without permission of the publisher: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, SINGAPORE 119614. FAX: (65)7756259; TEL: (65) 8702447; E-MAIL: publish@iseas.edu.sg 131 Taiwan after the Face-Off© 2001 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore which would enable it to hit several coastal cities in China.3 According to Reuters, in late 1995, Taiwan was revising its domestically-made anti-aircraft Sky Bow II missile to a surface-to-surface missile with a target range of between 480 and 960 kilometres, enabling it to hit more of China’s coastal cities and airports.4 It does not make military sense to spend huge financial resources to develop mid-range missiles if these missiles are not nuclear or chemical capable and thus a strategic deterrence. Is Taiwan secretly developing nuclear or chemical weapons? Through an “appropriate channel”, China once sealed an agreement with the United States that Taiwan put its nuclear facilities under the supervision of international atomic agencies.5 This was one of the conditions under which China agreed to join the International Atomic Energy Agency (I.A.E.A.). The I.A.E.A. supervision of Taiwan’s nuclear development was done through an “agreed channel”, commonly understood as the United States. How conscientious the Americans are is another question. Even if the United States sabotaged Taiwan’s nuclear weapons project in 1988 by taking away their nuclear weapon blue prints and dismantling the equipment, it could not take away the nuclear weapon technology that the Taiwanese have in their heads. The Chinese suspect that Taiwan may secretly start the project again.6 Gerald Segal of London’s International Institute for Strategic Studies (I.I.S.S.) made the assessment that Taiwan has the capability to develop nuclear weapons in a matter of 3–4 months.7 If Taiwan really does have the capability at the moment or in the future, even without possessing nuclear weapons, there are varifications for China’s strategic thinking and behaviour, which will in turn affect stability in East Asia. In other words, once Taiwan feels simultaneously threatened by China and abandoned by the United States, it may quickly and secretly develop nuclear weapons to protect itself, with or without a declaration of independence. Then, China either has to make concessions or take dramatic and swift military action to destroy Taiwan’s nuclear capability and its means of delivery such as the mid-range missiles it...