The Soul-Body Problem at Paris ca 1200-1250: Hugh of St-Cher and His Contemporaries

1.2 The human soul and the concept of person

1.2 The hUman soUl and The ConCePT of Person 1.2.1 “The hUman soUl Is noT a Person”. The sentences commentary of hUgh of sT-Cher The substantial and immortal ability to be united with the body represents the main feature differentiating the human soul from the angel. The first article of Hugh of St-Cher’s question De anima centres around this doctrine. Nevertheless, the reason why Hugh adopts this position is not totally clear; indeed, the question contains no justification for this theory. The Summa aurea offers no better explanations : indeed, William of Auxerre too makes no mention of the reasons why he adopts the theory of the substantial difference between soul and angel which is based on the union with the body. Hence, what is the origin of the unibilitas substantialis conception? In the question De anima, in addition to the first difference between the two spiritual substances, Hugh mentions a second distinction too: whereas the angel, like man, is a person, the soul is devoid of the character of person.140 The connection between the two differences does not explicitly appear in the text of our question. Yet, the link becomes evident if we turn to Hugh’s Commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences. In his commentary on at least three distinctions, the Dominican master insists that the human soul is not a person, and each time he justifies his position extensively. Indeed, although the soul is a substance having a rational nature, owing to the fact that it is united with the body it lacks the character of individuality; moreover, even when the composite dissolves due to death, nevertheless the soul is not a person, because “being a part” belongs to its nature independently of the presence of the body. Indeed, according to Hugh, the soul is never individual, because it was not created to subsist separately, but begins to exist at the very moment of infusion. The soul’s destiny is inseparably linked to the totality of the human being; for this reason, after death, the souls of the saints wish to be reunited with their bodies.141 140 Hugo de S. Caro, q. de an. i, ed. Bieniak, p. 17064-65 : “Et hec est secunda differentia anime et angeli quod angelus est persona et non anima sed homo ”. 141 Hugo de S. Caro, in iii Sent., d. 5, ed. Breuning, pp. 351353 -352382 : “Magister Hugo de Sancto Victore: Anima, inquantum est spiritus rationabilis, ex se et per se habet esse personae, et quando ei corpus associatur, non. (...) Sed magister Hugo et etiam Magister in 48 Part one The natural and immortal wish to be united with the body – about which Hugh writes in his Commentary on book iii of the Sentences – recalls another expression contained in the question De anima, i.e. ‘aptitudo’, that is, a suitability for union that remains in the separated soul:142 Ad secundum, quod anima et angelus differunt accidente solo etc., dicendum quod “regens” non dicit actum sed aptitudinem secundum quam anima apta est naturaliter regere corpus illo triplici regimine quod diximus, et hanc aptitudinem habet anima etiam separata. Hec enim est illa unibilitas de qua supra diximus. Indeed, unibilitas substantialis seems to be related to the characteristics of the human soul enumerated in the Commentary on book iii of the Sentences, namely: the lack of individuality and of the character of person; the desire of the soul for its body; the condition of “being a part” which is engraved in its nature; finally, the body as the proper place of the soul. Hence, in order to understand the origin of the substantial unibilitas theory, we should above all reconstruct the genesis of the soul-person doctrine. This doctrine refers to Boethius’ Theological Treatises and even more to the interpretation of the latter given by Gilbert of Poitiers. Hence, this chapter is intended first of all to be a search for the literary sources of Hugh’s texts and, secondly, an attempt at reconstructing the evolution leading from the assimilation of Boethius’ definition up to the denial of the personal character of the separated soul. 1.2.2 evolUTIon of eXPressIons Among all the treatments dealing with the question whether the human soul is a person, let us identify a number of texts influenced by the Commentary written by Gilbert of Poitiers († 1154) on Boethius’ Contra Eutychen et Nestorium.143 I have examined six authors living in the twelfth century and in the first half of...