The Concept of Love in 17th and 18th Century Philosophy

The Role of Amicitia in Political Life

The Role of Amicitia in Political Life Susan James, University of London The ancient idea that love consists in an urge to unite oneself to another reverberates throughout the literature of the early-modern period. It is explicated, for example, by Descartes, who explains that, when one is in love, one considers oneself and the object of one’s affection as part of a whole, and cares for this union in the way that one previously cared for oneself.1 For the most part, however, the unity of lovers is compatible with their distinctness. While Descartes does not rule out the possibility of states in which the boundary between lover and beloved is entirely dissolved, he maintains that the character of the bond between them is usually shaped by the lover’s perception of his relation to the object of his passion. In particular, the nature of his love depends on whether he perceives himself as the lesser element in the whole, or as its greater and nobler part. For example, if he loves a flower, a bird, or a building: [T]he highest perfection which this love can properly reach cannot make us put our life at any risk for the preservation of such things. For they are not among the nobler parts of the whole which we and they constitute, any more than our nails or our hair are among the nobler parts of our body; and it would be preposterous to risk the whole body for the preservation of our hair.2 The lover therefore needs to retain a robust sense of his own worth, as compared with that of his beloved, and this in turn presupposes that he remains an individual with distinct interests and qualities. The same applies, moreover, when an individual perceives the object of his affection as greater than himself, as when a man loves his ruler or his country. “If his love is perfect,” Descartes warns, “he should regard himself as only a tiny part of the whole which he and they constitute, [and] should be no more afraid to go to certain death for their service than one is afraid to draw a little blood from one’s arm to improve the health of the rest of the body.”3 Even where self-sacrifice may be required, the 43 1 “Letter to Chanut, 1 February 1647,” C. Adam et P. Tannery, Oeuvres de Descartes. Nouvelle presentation (12 vols., Paris, Vrin, 1964–76), iv, 600–617, translated in J. Cottingham , R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch and A. Kenny, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (3 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985–91), iii, 305–14. 2 J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch and A. Kenny, The Philosophical Writings of Descartes (3 vols., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985–91), iii, 311. 3 Ibid. 03_Boros_James.qxd 12/17/2007 2:21 PM Page 43 union that constitutes love is not a complete merging. While it alters the lover’s conception of his interests, and thus changes his sense of what it is rational for him to do, he continues to identify certain qualities as his own, and conceives of himself as a distinct part of the whole, whose actions can promote or undermine its wellbeing. This account is organised around an underlying conception of love as a way of overcoming neediness or lack. While some early-modern writers trace this interpretation back to Adam’s longing for a companion, to the soul’s yearning for the world of forms, or to a nostalgia for our prenatal experience in the womb, Descartes argues that our adult loves hark back to the time when the soul was first joined to the body and recognised its dependence on the matter that nourished it. “The soul, uniting itself willingly to that new matter, felt love for it; and later, if the food happened to be lacking, it felt sadness. And if its place was taken by some other matter unsuitable as food for the body, it felt hatred.”4 Thus, human love originates when the soul willingly joins itself to the body and begins to be concerned for the body’s needs, at which point its emotions begin to be organised around bodily satisfactions; but so-called real union does not destroy the distinctness of body and soul any more than subsequent loves destroy the distinctness of self and other. The view that love is grounded in the relationship between body and soul is consonant with Descartes’ view that our...