In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

CONCLUSION In this work I intended to give an alternative interpretation to the theme of the Belarusian national idea and nationalism in the context of the systemic transformation of Belarusian society. The thesis of the weak and undeveloped character of the Belarusian nation has occupied a definite place in the work of Belarusian alternative analysts and Western researchers alike. The emergence of the authoritarian regime and the failure of democratization of Belarusian society are traditionally viewed as both the symptom of a lack of Belarusian identity and the result of weak Belarusian nationalism, which are usually seen as closely interrelated phenomena. Since the first years of Belarusian independence, the disposition of political forces in the country has resulted in the complete merging of “democratization ” and “nationalization” rhetoric in the programs of Belarusian parties, whose political failure was assessed as a weakness of the Belarusian nation. The “Belarusian nation” in this context is the nation for which Belarusian nationalists and the Belarusian Popular Front are appealing, a nation of Belarusians opposed to the Soviet experience of Belarusianness. The defeat of political nationalism in the early 1990s made it logical to conclude that there was a deficiency of national identity in the minds of the Belarusian people.At the same time, the Republic of Belarus has a durable status as an antinational state formation. In this context, Belarusian society appears to be divided into two parts: the nationless majority supporting the regime and the Belarusian nation opposing the state. A number of associated factors are usually considered as additional indicators of the Belarusian national identity’s deficiency, such as the idea of building a union state with Russia, linguistic Russification, and, on the whole, the lack of anti-Russian and anti-Soviet sentiments in society. However, as was shown in Part IV, “Arguments and Paradoxes of Weak Belarusian Identity ,” these factors are far from simplistically interrelated. For example, hypothetical consent to a political union with Russia in practice does not signify that Belarusians are prepared to give up their state independence. Linguistic Russification, on the one hand, does not lead to political proRussianness ; on the contrary, the Belarusian-speaking population mani- fests greater readiness to integrate with Russia. This can be explained by the fact that alongside with the “conscious” Belarusian-speaking Belarusians in big cities there is also a large number of pro-Russian Belarusianspeaking villagers supporting regime. At the same time, Russian-speaking Belarusians call the Belarusian language their native mother tongue. Many Belarusians do not always distinguish themselves from Russians in terms of cultural identity (they are taught the common history, common traditions and roots of the Belarusian and Russian people). At the same time, they manifest a high “index of pride” in their Belarusianness. Moreover, precisely the part of society that comprises “the denationalized majority” (as the supporters of the current power are usually presented) demonstrates their Belarusian identity as an object of pride and as the main principle of their self-determination. Active consideration of these paradoxes indicates the existence of two different and, in many aspects, contradictory concepts of Belarusianness in present Belarusian political and cultural life. The research proceeds from the premise that the official Belarusian authorities, despite the openly authoritarian mode of rule and the numerous repressive mechanisms used to suppress dissidence in society, implement their own national project in social and political practice. The official political discourse, the ideology of the Belarusian state, is in fact a specific version of the Belarusian idea. It coexists and competes with the Belarusianness articulated in the nationalist discourse. Approximately half of Belarusian voters support the Belarusian regime, as is revealed in the results of referenda and elections conducted by the Belarusian authorities (independent exit-poll data) and independent opinion polls that assess trust in the Belarusian authorities and the official course of political and economic development, and confidence in official information sources. As a matter of fact, these data enable us to estimate the degree to which the ideas and basic formulations of the official concept of Belarusianness re- flect the self-perceptions prevalent in Belarusian society. In this situation, a justified question arises: is the given phenomenon of confidence in official policy and the ideas of Belarusian development articulated by the authorities a consequence of official policy in the sphere of “ideology of identity” of Belarusians or, on the contrary, do Belarusians support the authorities’ policy namely because the...

Share