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239 Document No. 39: Transcript of CPSU CC Politburo Meeting April 2, 1981 Soviet frustrations with the Polish leadership bubble to the surface in this record of an important Politburo discussion. Brezhnev relates a March 30 conversation with Kania in which he tells the Polish premier that his colleagues at the recent Polish Ninth CC Plenum were not only right to be critical of Kania and his Politburo allies, they should have “taken a cudgel to you. Then perhaps you would understand.” The group then discusses and agrees with a Polish request to have Andropov and Ustinov meet with Kania and Jaruzelski at Brest, on the Soviet–Polish border (see Document No. 43). At this stage, Kremlin concerns are still very much on the increase over whether the Poles are up to handling the crisis with the necessary severity. Gromyko describes information the Foreign Ministry has received that Jaruzelski is “completely crestfallen and does not know what to do next,” a situation he laments as “terrible.” Andropov adds that Jaruzelski “has finally gone limp and Kania has recently begun to drink more and more,” which he in turn terms “a very sad phenomenon .” Furthermore, Gromyko raises a basic question about the reliability of Polish security forces, urging that the Soviet military determine whether they would be sufficiently loyal if ever ordered to act. […] 5. On the situation in Poland. Brezhnev: We are all deeply alarmed about the further course of events in Poland . Worst of all is the fact that our friends listen to and agree with our recommendations but do practically nothing at all. And the counter-revolution is advancing on all fronts. The members of the Politburo are familiar with the contents of all the previous discussions with the Polish leaders. I will speak briefly about the most recent telephone conversation with Kania which took place on March 30. Kania reported on the PUWP CC plenum and in addition complained that they were roundly criticized at the plenum. I immediately said to him, “They acted correctly. They should not just have criticized you but taken a cudgel to you. Then perhaps you would understand.” These were literally my words. Cde. Kania admitted that they are acting gently, and that they should be more strict. To this I said to him, “And how many times have we tried to convince you that you must take drastic measures and that it is impossible to compromise endlessly with Solidarity? You speak repeatedly about a peaceful path, not understanding or not wishing to understand that this ‘peaceful path’ you claim to be making has cost you in blood. Therefore it is important to draw the proper conclusions from the criticism at the plenum.” 240 Our friends managed to avert a general strike. But at what cost? At the cost of successive capitulations before the opposition. Kania himself admitted in a discussion with our ambassador that the new compromise was a big mistake. Now much depends on how events will unfold in the coming days. In particular , will our friends carry through the measures we agreed upon through the Sejm, which, as was reported today, is being postponed from the 2nd to the 6th of April? Will all these measures be adopted in full? Do they have sufficient determination and strength to put these measures into practice? Of course, we must continue our work with our friends and seek out new ways to exert influence over circumstances in Poland. In particular, I think it would be worth it to meet the wishes of our friends halfway and allow Cdes. Andropov and Ustinov to travel to Brest to meet with Cdes. Kania and Jaruzelski. This will allow us to make a detailed examination of the situation in the country, assess our friends’ intentions, and restate our position. We still have in reserve the option of a new meeting of the Seven1 on the Polish question at the highest level. We have a Commission on Poland.2 Perhaps the comrades from the Commission , who are following events in that country, would like to say something? Andropov: I believe that the proposals articulated by Leonid Ilyich concerning further steps on Poland and the assessment of the situation there are completely correct. In fact, the point now is how to exert more influence and greater pressure on the leadership of our friends. I believe that the proposal concerning a trip by Cde. Ustinov and me to meet with Kania and Jaruzelski is a correct one. In accordance...

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