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162 Document No. 23: Minutes of U.S. Special Coordination Committee Meeting December 7, 1980 Two days after the critical Warsaw Pact leadership meeting, President Carter and his aides remained in doubt about Soviet intentions regarding Poland. According to CIA source Ryszard Kukliński, an intervention was set to take place the following day, but at the NSC meeting summarized below, the president indicated that it was unclear whether this would in fact happen. Still, the administration intended to take measures to try to forestall any such possibility. These included certain low-profile military moves, a range of political and economic actions and a major attempt—including another presidential message to allies, the text of which is included here—to persuade the Western allies to join forces in the enterprise. Summary of Conclusions An SCC meeting, chaired by Dr. Brzezinski, followed by an NSC meeting, chaired by the President was held on December 7 to discuss the U. S. response to Soviet preparations for a possible military intervention in Poland. The NSC agreed to issue a White House statement warning of preparations for a possible Soviet intervention in Poland expressing hope that such an intervention would not take place, and stressing the very adverse consequences for U. S.–Soviet relations of any Soviet military intervention in Poland. The purpose of the statement was to raise world consciousness about the possibility of a Soviet intervention in Poland, either through a surreptitious insertion of forces or through a full scale military invasion. It was hoped that such a statement might provoke a denial and help to deter any intervention. The President approved the texts of messages to Chancellor Schmidt, President giscard d’Estaing and Prime Minister Thatcher, informing them of our actions . Similar messages were also sent to the Italians, Canadians, Japanese, as well as Secretary general Luns of NATO and U. N. Secretary general Waldheim . It was agreed that Secretary [Edmund] Muskie would also call Waldheim personally. The President briefed Senators Cranston and Stevens and Congressmen Rhodes and O’Neill26 on the current developments in Poland and U. S. actions. He informed them that he was issuing a statement, which he read. He pointed 26 Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) and Ted Stevens (R-Alaska) were their parties’ assistant leaders (whips) in the U.S. Senate. John J. Rhodes (R-Ariz.) was House minority leader and Thomas J. (“Tip”) O’Neill, Jr. (D-Mass.) was Speaker of the House. 163 out that our action was based on our monitoring of Soviet military preparations. We had conflicting reports from the Summit27 and did not really know whether the Soviets were trying to move in or exactly how they would do it. It could be through open aggression or under the guise of maneuvers. The complicating factor was that Brezhnev planned to go to India on December 8. At the moment he was in Tashkent. We were consulting with our Allies and had also notified Richard Allen, who would brief governor Reagan as soon as he had left church. We were also sending messages to giscard, Thatcher and Schmidt, as well as to the Italians, Japanese, Canadians, U. N. and NATO, informing them of our actions and why we were undertaking them. The President then read the White House message to the congressional leaders . He noted that, due to a fortunate coincidence of circumstances, Secretaries [Harold] Brown and Muskie would be meeting with their Allied counterparts in Brussels next week. He pointed out that a Soviet move into Poland would reduce Soviet readiness-time for an attack upon Western Europe by a week. However, we did not expect an attack on Western Europe. If the Soviets intervened militarily , some bloodshed was likely, but it was unclear how much. We did not intend to get involved militarily, but we did intend to take a number of political and economic measures. Unfortunately, the more we did unilaterally, the less the Europeans were likely to do. The President also asked Secretary Brown to outline the military measures we had taken. Secretary Brown stated that we were doing some things unilaterally , mostly in the area of logistics. However, we were not taking high-visibility personnel moves. SACEUR had asked for authority to take certain preparatory measures but he had not asked for authority to actually implement them. We could do some other additional things such as adding F-l5s or moving some divisions to Europe. We were reluctant to do these, however, before first pressing the Allies. In...

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