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1 The Polish Crisis: Internal and International Dimensions by Andrzej Paczkowski and Malcolm Byrne When Poland’s rulers suddenly raised meat prices nationwide on July 1, 1980, no-one expected that the decision would touch off a chain reaction that would undermine the foundations of the Polish communist system by the end of the decade. Yet, this is exactly what happened, and although historians disagree as to what (or who) played the decisive role in ultimately toppling communism, there is no question that what is often described as the “Polish crisis of 1980–1981” made a significant contribution. In fact, the Polish crisis did not finally end until the second half of 1988, when the communist authorities recognized that there was no solution other than to begin profoundly reforming the system. This, of course, led within months to a total systemic transformation—to the creation of a democratic state and a market economy. The 1980–1981 period was therefore only the first phase in a long-term process . But it retains crucial significance because it was precisely at this juncture that an alternative political force to the communist party emerged and took shape—the “Solidarity” trade union. Without the creation of that alternative institution, it probably would have proven impossible to shift from merely reforming the system to transforming it. It is also highly plausible that without the changes that occurred in Poland the communist system would not have been rejected in other Central-East European countries, including the german Democratic Republic, in 1989. The loss of control over this region and the unification of germany were, in turn, decisively important for the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and thus for the end of the Cold War. The “Polish crisis” is therefore relevant not only as the prologue to an important fragment of European history, but as a model for how an internal crisis can affect international politics, and ultimately as a reference point for analyzing the final implosion of the communist system. THE POLISH CASE In many respects, Poland differed from other Soviet bloc states. Naturally, each had its own characteristic features, but in our opinion three distinct attributes are fundamentally important for comprehending the character of the events of 1980– 1981: the strikes, the Church, and the opposition.1 1 For the historical context to these events, see Paczkowski, The Spring Will Be Ours. 2 The Strikes. Starting in 1956, a number of economic strikes took place that turned into revolts which the authorities quickly stifled but which greatly affected the ruling Polish United Workers’ Party (PUWP). This was the case when unrest in Poznań in June 1956, preceded by a strike, polarized the party leadership and created acute social tensions, which were alleviated only by a combination of changes at the pinnacle of power and by basic transformations in economic policy and other spheres of national and state life. Although those changes were part of a general scheme of de-Stalinization, the “Poznań incidents,” as they were enigmatically termed at the time, acquired added drama because the workers ’ revolt inherently undermined the party’s Marxist–Leninist justification for governing “in the name of the working class.” Much less profound but just as immediate were the effects of strikes and street riots in December 1970 in a number of towns along the Baltic coast—gdańsk, gdynia, Elbląg and Szczecin—which responded to a drastic hike in food prices. PUWP leader Władysław gomułka, who in 1956 had won enthusiastic approval from most of Polish society for facing down a direct threat of intervention from Moscow,2 was ousted from power. In order to calm public anger the authorities made him a scapegoat, but the very fact that an authoritarian leader had been relegated to political non-existence because of an event that could be described as a “revolt of inferiors” convinced the public that such revolts could be effective. A similar protest took place in 1976, centering mainly in the city of Radom. This time, the riots were put down without resort to the army (which in the past had led to dozens of fatalities). Nonetheless, the possibility of strikes spreading across the country was curbed only by the virtually instantaneous reversal of the price hikes that once again had been the original cause of the unrest. Not a single head “rolled,” but the authorities were forced to retreat once more, yielding to pressure from the streets by abandoning an important policy...

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