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Document No. 60: Czechoslovak–Soviet Agreement on the Stationing of Soviet Nuclear Forces, November 13–14, 1968 ——————————————————————————————————————————— This document is a report by Chief of Gen. Staff Rusov to President Svoboda about the secret agreement governing the stationing of Soviet nuclear missiles in Czechoslovakia . The issue of Soviet nuclear deployments on the territory of other Warsaw Pact states was one of the most sensitive that arose within the alliance.31 With respect to Czechoslovakia, the Soviet-led invasion added a new twist. A Czech author, Jiří Fidler , has asserted that one of the main reasons for the invasion was to force Czechoslovakia to accept the Soviet missiles.32 In fact, the two countries had signed agreements on the matter well before 1968, reflecting the view of certain senior Czechoslovak military and political leaders that having those weapons stationed on their territory provided additional security against the West. Although it is highly probable that the missle deployments occurred, there is no conclusive evidence on this point as yet. ____________________ INFORMATION REPORT for the President of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, Comrade L. Svoboda 1. Based on the Agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, dated December 15, 1965, three facilities garrisoned by Soviet troops with special tasks will be established on our territory to ensure full combat readiness of the Czechoslovak People’s Army (codeword project “Javor” [Maple]). Issues connected with the implementation of the project were communicated to you on October 23, 1968, and you have voiced your full approval of it. 2. At the moment, specific measures are going to be taken to hand over some of the facilities and buildings to designated Soviet special units. Between November 13 and November 14, 1968, the General Staffs of the Armed Forces of the USSR and Czechoslovakia prepared a “Protocol” finalizing all issues related to the above project. The Czechoslovak side has succeeded in asserting all interests of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the Czechoslovak People’s Army in the Protocol. 31 Cf. Mark Kramer, “The ‘Lessons’ of the Cuban Missile Crisis for Warsaw Pact Nuclear Operations ,” Cold War International History Project Bulletin 5 (1995): 59, 110–15, 160. 32 Jiří Fidler, 21.8.1968: Okupace Československa: Bratrská agrese [August 21, 1968: The Occupation of Czechoslovakia: A Fraternal Aggression] (Prague: Havran, 2003), pp. 106–10. 314 Contrary to the existing concept, which I mentioned in my report of October 23, 1968, the Protocol contains some changes resulting from the temporary stationing of other Soviet troops on our territory, namely: a) Given that there is now a new situation on Czechoslovak territory, trying to deny and conceal the presence of Soviet troops in the above-mentioned facilities would be illogical and inappropriate from the viewpoint of secrecy; however , the utmost must be done not to disclose the true nature of the facilities by sticking to an adopted cover story (the same approach will also be adopted vis- à-vis the Headquarters of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic); b) Insofar as garrison duties, disciplinary matters, etc. are concerned, the Soviet troops stationed in the above-mentioned facilities will be subordinated to the Commander-in-Chief of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in Czechoslovakia; as to professional matters, they will continue to be subordinated directly to the General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces; c) Insofar as Subparagraphs (a) and (b) are concerned, the Czechoslovak side will basically not be responsible for a number of duties vis-à-vis the Soviet troops stationed in the above-mentioned facilities (logistical support, guarding, training , etc.)—these duties will be handled in the same way as with other Soviet units and formations temporarily stationed in Czechoslovakia. Thus, only the following planned measures are to be accomplished by the Czechoslovak party: – maintaining the nature of the facilities in question in secrecy (including necessary contacts with representatives of Czechoslovak local government bodies , in particular insofar as the maintenance of special parts of the facilities is concerned); – provision of quarters in the spirit of the basic Agreement of December 15, 1965; – provision of reliable communications with the General Staff of the Czechoslovak People’s Army and, through the latter’s exchange, also with the Headquarters of Soviet troops temporarily stationed in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic; – participationofCzechoslovaktroopsinextraordinarymeasurestakentoensure full protection and defense of the facilities in question; – other issues, if necessary and appropriate (the extent of which will be limited ),sinceespeciallytheJincefacilityisfairlyfarawayfromGeneralMaiorov’s formations, and because no Soviet command offices are...

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