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Document No. 22: The “Mazowsze” Exercise for Nuclear War and Interview with Gen. Tuczapski on Soviet Bloc Planning of Exercises, circa April 23, 1963 ——————————————————————————————————————————— One of the changes in Warsaw Pact strategy after the Berlin crisis was to account for the possible heavy use of nuclear armaments. The first document here describes a Polish military exercise from April 18–22, 1963, which was designed to prepare for a war involving the detonation of huge numbers of such weapons. The exercise takes for granted that practically every major Polish city would be hit, causing massive casualties , yet presumes that fighting would continue and that enemy forces would actually be repelled. In retaliation against NATO’s initiation of hostilities, including its firstuse of nuclear weapons, the Warsaw Pact conducts a total of 61 nuclear counterstrikes against Western Europe and the United States resulting in 33 million dead in the U.S. after two days, but only 1.3 million dead in Poland. In the concluding evaluation, the defense minister repeats the unfounded Soviet claim that the USSR possessed missiles that could strike any target on earth. In the second document below, Gen. Tadeusz Tuczapski, who was in charge of Poland’s homeland defense in the early 1960s, offers a very different viewpoint in this interview conducted by Polish military historians in the 1990s.17 Charged with ensuring the continued functioning of society, the economy, and government administration , Tuczapski was in a position to know what was feasible or not under wartime conditions . He claimed always to have been skeptical of the viability of some of the plans from the 1960s that presumed the normal functioning of government and society after a major nuclear attack. His description of how the Soviet military drew up operational plans and merely summoned generals from Poland—as they did from other countries —to sign off on the finished product raises questions for historians about the behavior and motivations of East European military and political leaders in submitting to Moscow. Were they willing accomplices of the Kremlin, and if so, was it for ideological or opportunistic reasons? Or were they protecting their countries’ interests under difficult circumstances? Tuczapski implies that Poland’s political leadership did not know the details of the plans, nor did it care. ____________________ 17 Gen. Tuczapski was among several Polish generals to be interviewed, and distinguished himself by being one of the most forthcoming and candid. For transcripts of interviews with East European former military commanders, see http://www.isn.ethz.ch/php/collections/coll_9.htm. The interviews gave the generals an opportunity to justify their record for posterity. 140 a) The “Mazowsze” Exercise Situation No. 1, 05:00, 4/20 (Outline 3) At 03:00, 4/20, the “Western” forces carried out a massive nuclear strike against the territories of the Warsaw Treaty states by using missiles, aircraft, and submarines. Following the nuclear strikes, the enemy launched offensive operations by airborne and naval forces in the western theater of operations. The airborne troops of the enemy achieved the greatest success in the operational area of Army Group “Center.” The forces of Army Group “North,” attacking in the operational area of the Coastal Front of the “Eastern,” forces, on whose left flank Polish divisions waged stubborn resistance, did not achieve notable success. In response to the aggression, at 03:00, 4/20, the “Eastern” forces carried out a massiveretaliatorystrikeinaccordancewiththegeneralplanoftheSupremeCommand of the Unified Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty. During the strike, directed against the European NATO countries located in the western theater of operations as well as against the territory of the United States, 276 nuclear missiles of over 188 megatons magnitude were launched, of which 190 of 8,290 kilotons magnitude were directed against the FRG, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Great Britain, and 86 of 180 megatons magnitude against the United States. At the same time, the “Eastern” side introduced additional forces into the zone of combat. The second echelon of Soviet forces was moved into the territory of Poland. By 05:00, 4/20, the first echelon of Soviet forces had been regrouped to the western bank of the Oder river. The overall situation in the country was as follows. During the massive nuclear strike, despite intensive air defense that made the enemy lose 90 aircraft and about 40 missiles, the enemy succeeded in carrying out 55 nuclear strikes of 2,150 kilotons magnitude on the territory of Poland. As a result of the strikes, the air defense forces lost...

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