In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Document No. 117: Czechoslovak Summary of the Committee of Ministers of Foreign Affairs Meeting in Bucharest, October 18, 1986 ——————————————————————————————————————————— Following shortly after the Reykjavik summit between Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, this Warsaw Pact foreign ministers’ meeting provided a forum for the Soviets to explain the content of the summit to the allies and to solicit their cooperation in taking follow-up action. In answer to the Soviet call to retain the initiative in international affairs, the ministers agree to wage a “broad offensive” not only in the ongoing Geneva talks but also at the CSCE. Each Warsaw Pact representative proceeds to advance proposals for how to accomplish this task. ____________________ A regular session of the Warsaw Pact Committee of Foreign Ministers took place in Bucharest on October 14–15, 1986, in accordance with the timetable of meetings of the Warsaw Pact’s highest political institutions. This had been approved at the 1986 Budapest session of the Warsaw Pact Political Consultative Committee within the framework of strengthening the Warsaw Pact mechanism. Originally, the session had been planned for October 16–17, 1986; the change occurred because of the USSR leadership’s initiative to inform the foreign ministers about the proceedings and results of the Gorbachev–Reagan Reykjavik meeting immediately after its conclusion. […] Before the session of the Committee of Foreign Ministers, an informal private meeting of the ministers took place […], in which [Foreign Minister] Shevardnadze gave detailed information on the preparation, course and conclusions of the meeting between Gorbachev and Reagan in Reykjavik on October 11–12, 1986. […] The decision to meet at Reykjavik amounted to a psychological turning point for Reagan. [Secretary of State] G. Shultz played a constructive role in that. At the same time, influential forces had been opposing the meeting. The meeting has been a tactical success for the Soviet leadership. […] Reagan saw the aim of the meeting as probing the possibility of Gorbachev’s visit to the United States. The USSR replied that the visit would take place when possibilities for reaching particular agreements were visible. A summit without any results would be a political scandal. Seeing that he could not expect any initiative by Reagan, Gorbachev suggested opening specific negotiations on nuclear and space disarmament at the ministerial level. In strategic affairs, the USSR introduced a new variant of the 50 percent reduction without including missiles in forward areas. The United States had not expected this approach. The USSR further declared that it would consider the United States’ interest in a reduction of heavy inter-continental ballistic missiles, and proclaimed its expectation that the United States would understand the USSR’s interest in a reduction of U.S. submarine-launched ballistic missiles. 541 As far the INF57 is concerned, the USSR accepted the zero option in Europe. It even agreed to freeze vehicles with a range of up to 1,000 kilometers and start negotiating about them. It proposed freezing the numbers of missiles in Asia and beginning negotiations on their reduction so that only 100 nuclear warheads would remain in the Asian part of the USSR; the United States could keep the same number on its territory. USSR further suggested strengthening the regime of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM).58 It accepted the method proposed by the United States, namely, setting up a period during which the treaty could not be renounced or the ensuing negotiations discontinued. […] Gorbachev stressed that he understood the SDI matter59 is a prestigious one for the president who is bound with this program. Therefore he suggested agreeing with research under laboratory conditions. […] The USSR further suggested restoring negotiations on a complete nuclear test ban either with the participation of Great Britain or without it, considering that it would be possible to reach a compromise, provisional solution, for example reducing the number and yield of detonations. The United States only raised its old proposals in Geneva, refurbished to look as if they amounted to a new position. Gorbachev responded that he had heard of these proposals from [U.S. chief negotiator] M[ax] Kampelman in Geneva. He handed the president a table with precise numbers of U.S. and USSR strategic forces. Reagan asked whether he could keep the document; Gorbachev replied that the document is secret, but that the USSR trusts the United States. A whole strategic weapons triad wasincludedinthetable.ReaganandShultzwereimpressedbyGorbachev’sapproach. […] Gorbachev further asked whether the United States was willing to go for a zero option in Europe on the assumption that the means...

Share