Maritime Security in Southeast Asia

Safety and Security in the Malacca Strait: The Limits of Collaboration

5 the national bureau of asian research SHELDON W. SIMON is Professor in the School of Politics and Global Studies at Arizona State University. He can be reached at . NOTE The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Professor See Seng Tan and Oleg Korovin of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore and Olivia Mohammad of the Arizona State University (ASU) Political Science Junior Fellows Program. The author would also like to acknowledge research support from the National Bureau of Asian Research, the ASU School of Politics and Global Studies, the ASU Center for Asian Research, the Hiroshima Peace Institute, and the Japan Forum of International Affairs. Safety and Security in the Malacca Strait: The Limits of Collaboration Sheldon W. Simon Originally published in: Sheldon Simon, John Bradford, James Manicom, and Neil Quartaro, “Maritime Security in Southeast Asia: U.S., Japanese, Regional, and Industry Strategies,” National Bureau of Asian Research, NBR Special Report, no. 24, November 2010.© 2012 The National Bureau of Asian Research. This PDF is provided for the use of authorized recipients only. For specific terms of use, please contact . EXECUTIVE SUMMARY This study addresses prospects for enhanced cooperative security among user states, littoral states, and the private sector shipping industry for improving safety and security in the Malacca Strait—one of the world’s busiest maritime highways. MAIN ARGUMENT The Malacca Strait is arguably the world’s busiest and most important waterway. Increased vulnerability of shipments through the area—from such causes as piracy and armed robbery to navigation and safety concerns—prompted littoral and user states to mount a series of initiatives that helped significantly bolster ship security in the region over the last several years. User states are providing financial and technical assistance to the littoral states, but this assistance has been largely bilateral, with some new collaboration among the participants suggesting a multilateral approach to enhancing safety and security. Questions remain, however, about the sustainability of these programs, additional needs and opportunities, and the lessons they may offer for enhancing safety and security in other regions. POLICY IMPLICATIONS • Greater cooperation among user states, littoral states, and shippers for enhancing safety and security in the Malacca Strait should be promoted through the 2007 Cooperative Mechanism. • The shipping industry should increase its contributions for safety and security, perhaps through funding the installation of Automatic Identification System (AIS) transponders on smaller ships to track their locations. • Malaysia and Indonesia should join the Singapore-based Information Fusion Center, thus providing complete coverage on maritime crime to the Malacca Strait countries. • The primary user states—the U.S., Japan, Australia, China, South Korea, and perhaps India—should consider forming a users consortium to allocate responsibilities for improving safety features, such as wreck removal and radar installations, in the strait. • User states should provide technical assistance and financial support to the littoral states’ air force and navy patrols, thus improving their capacities. 7 SAFETY AND SECURITY IN THE MALACCA STRAIT u SIMON A t 520 nautical miles long and extremely narrow at numerous places, the Straits of Malacca and Singapore constitute one of the world’s busiest waterways, linking the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Commercial traffic from Europe and the Arabian Gulf passes through the straits on the way to Northeast Asia; and maritime trade from the western Pacific Rim reciprocates, destined for South and West Asia as well as for Europe. Tankers and bulk carriers move vast quantities of coal, iron ore, and minerals to manufacturing centers in Southeast andNortheastAsia,whilecontainershipsladenwithconsumergoodsflowintheoppositedirection. This trade constitutes more than half the world’s merchant fleet tonnage. Because of shallow reefs and many small islands, and with over 70,000 ships passing through every year, maritime traffic in the straits must transit at greatly reduced speeds, making it vulnerable to maritime crime and piracy—a hazard that has plagued the Malacca Strait for centuries. Between 1999 and 2008, traffic in the strait increased by 74%. Japan’s Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism estimates that 114,000 ships will use the strait by 2020.1 The geopolitical and legal complexities of the Malacca Strait may be found in the disputes that encompass the strait’s internal waters, territorial seas, contiguous zones, and exclusive economic zones (EEZ)—all under the 1982 UN Law of the Sea. Overlapping jurisdictions have led to complaints by countries in the strait against one another—for example, Jakarta has protested Malaysia...