Strategic Asia 2005-06: Military Modernization in an Era of Uncertainty

China’s Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress

Executive Summary This chapter analyzes the direct and contextual factors driving Chinese military modernization efforts, evaluates the current capabilities and development trajectories of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), and assesses the likely impact that an increasingly modern Chinese military will have on Asian regional security. main argument: Although Chinese modernization has accelerated and improved in pace and scope at a surprising rate, this should not be misconstrued to mean that the PLA can transform itself into a first-class military with global reach over the next decade. The PLA’s regional reach will, however, steadily improve—and consequently will alter the balance of power in Asia. policy implications: • China’s military modernization is shaped not only by the military dimensions of the Taiwan issue, but also by a number of other contextual drivers (i.e., China’s desire to become a global power, the regional security environment , the U.S. military footprint around Asia, and growing energy needs) and direct drivers (i.e., China’s military budget, domestic politics, military doctrine and defense policy, and effects of the military-industrial complex). • China’s aspirations and plans for its military modernization program are on par for a nation of China’s location, size, wealth, national interests, and global role. China David Shambaugh is Professor of Political Science & International Affairs at The George Washington University, where he also directs the China Policy Program. In addition, he is a nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Studies Program and the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution. He can be reached at . The author wishes to thank Dennis Blasko, Paul H.B. Godwin, and Eric McVadon for their excellent comments and suggestions on previous drafts, and Peter Mattis for his research assistance. China’s Military Modernization: Making Steady and Surprising Progress David Shambaugh This chapter explores the state of China’s military modernization program in 2005, assesses how much progress the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has made in recent years, discusses the drivers of the program, elucidates its principal trends and trajectories, identifies important indicators to monitor in the future, and notes important policy implications for the United States. There are two main types of drivers that shape China’s military modernization program: contextual and direct. Contextual drivers include a range of external factors in China’s national security environment that shape China ’s threat perceptions, strategic outlook, and contingency planning. Direct drivers include a range of financial, political, and technological factors more internal to China. These contextual and direct drivers are thus respectively the focus of the first two sections of the chapter. Sections three and four overview PLA capabilities. Section three is an inventory of PLA forces and weapons capabilities, while section four offers a net assessment of the current state of China’s military modernization program by evaluating progress made, as well as deficiencies and challenges ahead. A concluding section identifies indicators to watch in assessing future progress in China’s military modernization and offers implications for U.S. policy. 6 • Strategic Asia 2005–06 Contextual Drivers of China’s Military Modernization Taiwan Preventing Taiwan independence (and concomitantly bringing about “reunification” with the mainland) is one of China’s highest priorities. For the PLA this translates into a military mission, if so ordered, of forcibly preventing Taiwan independence. As the 2004 Defense White Paper boldly warned: “Should the Taiwan authorities go so far as to make a reckless attempt that constitutes a major incident of ‘Taiwan independence,’ the Chinese people and armed forces will resolutely and thoroughly crush it at any cost.”1 In actuality, preparing for a series of potential conflict scenarios with Taiwan (and the United States) is the nearest-term catalyst for defense resource allocations and military preparations, and is driving a number of decisions regarding weapons procurements and deployments, training and readiness, and other elements of the PLA’s order of battle. These preparations include attaining the capabilities to perform the following military tasks: • launch precision strikes against high-value command, control, and political targets • using special operation forces, undertake sabotage attacks against key military and civilian infrastructure targets on Taiwan and adjacent islands • ground Taiwan’s air force by saturating airfields, runways, and aircraft shelters with ballistic or cruise missiles • “deafen and blind” Taiwan’s command, control, communications, and intelligence infrastructure through a combination of missile strikes and electronic and information warfare attacks (including, perhaps, atmospheric electromagnetic pulse...