Citizen of Zimbabwe: Conversations with Morgan Tsvangirai

Introduction

1 Introduction The idea for this book came at Easter 2004. At that time the ruling party in Zimbabwe, ZANU(PF), thought it had turned a corner in its struggle with the opposition MDC. On 29 March the MDC had lost the parliamentary by-election in Zengeza – a seat it would normally have regarded as a stronghold. There had been no massive intimidation of voters by ZANU(PF),1 but the four years of continuing harassment sincetheMDCwonthe2000constitutionalreferendum–awarofunremitting attrition – had taken their toll. The MDC was demoralised. Its tactics of resistance, mass days of urban action, strikes and stayaways, had not led to the crumbling of ZANU(PF). In fact, ZANU(PF) did not even seem weakened. Nevertheless, the defeat at Zengeza revitalised the debate within the MDC as to whether it should boycott the parliamentary elections in March 2005. A triumphant Robert Mugabe mocked his defeated opponents: They now fear elections and are giving all sorts of lame excuses for boycotting elections. We dare them. Boycott or no boycott, well, you are ripe for burial and we will put you to eternal sleep in March next year, but not at the Heroes Acre.2 A string of articles in the state press appeared, with very little variation , pronouncing upon the decline and imminent demise of the MDC. Some of this played upon emerging factions within the opposition . One headline, ‘MDC intellectuals plan splinter party’,3 was particularly revealing, as if ZANU(PF) discerned an Achilles’ Heel within the MDC – the uneasy alliance between trade unionists and their days of action, and their more cerebral colleagues who had become alarmed at the MDC’s lack of skilful representation both at home and abroad. Even the residual non-government press, down to three weeklies after the government had successfully pushed the Daily News into closure , was unflattering of the MDC and its prospects. The headline, ‘Is MDC’s urban support on the wane?’,4 merely repeated a question on everyone’s lips. And two headlines in the Financial Gazette, the longest-surviving independent newspaper, suggested that the ‘MDC Introduction Citizen of Zimbabwe: Conversations with Morgan Tsvangirai 2 pays for complacency’ and, more ominously, sought to analyse ‘[t]he leadership cancer in the MDC’.5 None of this should, however, underestimate the campaign waged by ZANU(PF) against the MDC; nor should it underestimate the huge disparity in the organisational foundations of the two parties. The government could pour huge resources into ZANU(PF). It monopolised all broadcasting. The press, whether free or not, was only a minor player compared to the rural outreach of indigenous-language radio. The MDC had initially organised well in its urban heartlands, but had no real rural infrastructure – and neither its trade unionists nor its intellectuals had any sustained sense of rural policy. ZANU(PF), on the other hand, had built a formidable party control of the countryside , which in more recent days it had augmented with paramilitary bullying and control of food relief. Its farm seizures had caused chaos, dislocation and hunger. Equitable land redistribution was always going to be necessary in an independent Zimbabwe; however, the manner in which the process has been carried out and the distribution of land to a chosen elite have rendered the process violent and unjust. With its rural control mechanisms, and a sullen but not seriously resistant acquiescence to its policies, ZANU(PF) continued to command most of the countryside while the MDC searched for a viable urban strategy. And, even in the MDC urban strongholds, ZANU(PF) militants often had free rein to bully, beat and intimidate all those they suspected of opposition membership. They are dramatic parallels, but I have always likened the MDC’s efforts to those of the horse-mounted Polish and Finnish cavalry units who heroically charged the armoured tanks of Hitler on the one hand and Stalin on the other; or of the Bangladeshi farmers who, mounted on tractors, charged against a squadron of Pakistani tanks. The Poles, Finns and Bangladeshis all won in the end – but after much time and cost. In Zimbabwe, it seemed the MDC was arguing over what sort of sabre should be used against the ZANU(PF) tanks. And ZANU(PF), having first ensured it would maintain the disparities in strength, was crowing. The loss of Zengeza was followed by others, and these were dark days for the MDC. There is a tendency within Zimbabwe – not unlike that in many developing countries – to view politics through...