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29 Chaka Chirozva Introduction The world is characterised by the skewed distribution of power within and among various levels of social organisation, and decentralisation is a mechanism of aligning governmental powers among these different levels. (Murombedzi 1991; Murphree 1991; Ribot 1999). Although the merits of decentralisation are now more readily understood, efficiency, equity and democratic goals are not clearly evident. Decentralisation seeks to empower local bodies and communities by bestowing upon them ‘bundles of entrustments ’ transferred from the central state (Ribot 1999). Such entrustments include regulatory and executive powers, responsibility and authority in decision making, institutional infrastructure and assets, and administrative responsibilities. In its most ideal form, decentralisation should result in devolution or democratic decentralisation in which entrustments are transferred to lower levels, and preferably elected authorities that are largely or wholly independent of central government (Bosuyt and Gould 2000). But in practice decentralisation often results in outcomes that are commonly referred to as de-concentration in that states extend themselves into the local arena by the transfer of some entrustments to local branches of government that remain responsible and accountable to central government (Agrawal and Ribot 1999; Ribot 1999). This is a weak form of decentralisation because the downward accountability relations from which many benefits are expected are not established as in democratic or political forms of decentralisation. Although the ideal form may appear somewhat extreme, the common outcome of decentralisation raises questions of whether or not decentralisation as a policy strategy is desirable. As pointed out by Ruitenbeek and Cartier (2001: 4), policy makers are impatient and often seek a quick fix when things are better left to themselves. Their ‘hands off’ approach appears a crude but poignant reminder to environment and development practitioners to be more modest in their quest to effect change, because change cannot be invented; it is a pervasive and eternal feature of all social and ecological systems. And 3 Rethinking the Building Blocks: A Critique of Demand Driven Decentralisation in Chizvirizvi Resettlement Area in Chiredzi Rural District of Zimbabwe Chaka Chirozva 30 RETHINKING THE BUILDING BLOCKS … there is absolutely no reason to assume that peasant communities are so fatalistic and improvident that they are incapable of appropriately adjusting to changes in their everyday social and other environments. More often than not, most such people are adapting to change in ways that are more attuned to the prevailing challenges and opportunities, and what they do, or what they are capable of doing, is often a reflection of options and resources at their disposal. Such systems evolve naturally. It is in the face of such a truism that Ruitenbeek and Cartier (2001:17) strongly argue for non-interventionism, with the related foreclosure hypothesis being that ‘premature introduction of external interventions could lead to system failure. This may occur because the introduction of such a process disrupts existing evolutionary processes within the system.’ Experiences with decentralisations appear to lend weight to this conjecture. For instance, in pointing out how most such interventions in southern Africa tend to turn into de-concentrations, Murphree (1991) observes that ‘there is a tendency in bureaucratic hierarchies to seek power from levels above and a general reluctance to devolve such power to levels below’. Similar sentiments are echoed by Conyers (1990) and Murombedzi (1991), who point out that higher level actors tend to decentralise service type activities whilst retaining control of fiscal and production oriented activities. In supply led empowerment scenarios, state level and other external actors hold wide discretionary powers with respect to the form and extent of power to be given to actors on the fringes of formal systems of power, including local level bodies and communities. Mandondo (2001) articulates a language of alternatives and reversals in which he argues that decentralisation is likely to result in more thoroughgoing empowerment if it is demand driven. Such reversals and alternatives fall under the rubric of emancipatory approaches (Reason 1999), and have also been popularised as ‘putting the last first’ (Chambers 1983). The ideals, in relation to everyday common outcomes of decentralisation, therefore implicitly justify a continuum of policy options that span from fullscale and wholesome intervention to non-intervention. There is mid-point logic of balances that occupies the centre of the continuum. Its basic argument is that no one among local communities, researchers and other stakeholders holds a monopoly of insight or is a priori exclusively endowed with superior qualities in terms of knowledge and skills; that none of the stakeholders will accept to be simply...

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