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Chapter 8 sOuth AfrICA roy licklider The term Security Sector Reform (SSR) had not yet been invented when South Africa embarked on it. —Gavin Cawthra, Post-War Security Transitions South Africa has a fair claim to be considered the poster child for negotiated settlements , although its relatively low level of wartime violence makes calling it a civil war a stretch. Analysts spent several decades seized with the fear of a race war in a country with nuclear weapons; the eventual settlement caught almost all outsiders by surprise, and the country’s ability to shift from white to black political dominance in a peaceful , democratic manner was, in retrospect, nothing less than astounding. Moreover, the settlement was largely a local product; certainly international pressure and support helped, but this was not a coerced settlement like those in, say, Zimbabwe, Bosnia, or Kosovo. For all its problems, South Africa is evidence—at least for the first twenty years—that negotiated settlements can work in very hard cases. The period from 1991 to 1994 was perhaps the most violent in the history of the country; as Zartman (1995a, 167) noted, “a successful conclusion does not imply a friendly process.” Nonetheless, the principals were able to agree to a Government of National Unity, an interim Constitution was approved by December 1993, and Nelson Mandela won South Africa’s first democratic presidential election on April 27, 1994. The transition was solidified by security-sector reforms, including the merging of the apartheid-era national defense force with the forces of the “independent homelands ” and the liberation movements. OrIgINs Military integration in South Africa involved eight different forces. They had different military cultures and did not even share a common language. Policy was set by senior personnel of the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the Umkhonto We Sizwe (Spear of the Nation, or MK) in extensive negotiations. The Historic Role of the Military Interestingly, the apartheid-era SADF was itself the product of military integration. By the end of the nineteenth century, there were two different European populations in South Africa: those of Dutch descent who spoke Afrikaans, and English colonists AutONOmOus develOPmeNt 120 who spoke English. They fought in the South African War (1899–1902), and the British side finally won a very costly victory. In 1910, the Union of South Africa united the former Boer republics with the British colonies. As Rocky Williams (2006, 37–50) points out, the SADF was an amalgam of English and Boer units that had fought each other in the war, and it was intended to be apolitical. Jan Smuts, then minister of defense (and a former Boer general and future South African prime minister), said: “We want an organization that shall not be Boer or English, but a South African army. . . . Do your duty in a broad national spirit” (Williams 2006, 39). The first senior staff officers’ course at the new military college in 1912 included twenty-five British and twenty-five Boer officers who had fought against each other in the war. Interestingly, the new army had problems similar to those that came up during the merger of the SADF with other military groups, and it almost failed because of “rival political tensions” (Williams 2006, 41–42; cf. Seegers 1996, 10–25). After 1948, most of the English senior personnel were purged (Williams 1994). In 1957, the force was renamed the South African Defence Force. The 1974 coup in Portugal resulted in independence for Angola and Mozambique, threatening the South African apartheid regime directly. South Africa declared a “Total Strategy,” which linked economic reforms with a military buildup and the mobilization of the white community. The SADF launched destabilization activities, including military raids and invasions, on Namibia, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Lesotho, with mixed success. During the final stages of apartheid, the SADF was employed in putting down disturbances in South Africa itself (Cawthra 1997, 27–53). Historically, nonwhites had served in the South African armed forces; one authority traces their involvement as far back as the seventeenth century (Seegers 1996, 1–7). After the South African War they were kept in noncombat positions and almost always led by white officers. They were given limited combat roles when manpower became a serious issue; for example, both sides used them during the South African War, some units saw combat in World War I, and in the 1970s an incremental process led to the formation of ethnic combat units and even some limited racial integration within units (Grundy...

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