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NOTES In notes that cite an interview, all interviewees wish to remain anonymous. 1. Introduction 1. ‘‘JI Welcomes Opposition Alliance for LB Polls,’’ The Nation (Pakistan), July 19, 2005; and ‘‘Opposition Vows to Resist Government Candidates,’’ The Nation (Pakistan), September 23, 2005. 2. Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution: The Jama’at-I Islami of Pakistan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 172. 3. Humeira Iqtidar, Secularizing Islamists?: Jama’at-e-Islami and Jama’at-ud-Da’wa in Urban Pakistan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011). 4. Muhammad Waseem and Mariam Mufti, Religion, Politics and Governance in Pakistan, Religions and Development Research Programme, Working Paper 27 (Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham, 2009), 42. 5. Owais Tohid, ‘‘Interview: Maulana Fazlur Rehman,’’ Newsline, July 15, 2003. 6. For some examples of such competition in the 2013 elections, see Gandhara, ‘‘Once Allied, Religious Parties Compete against Each Other in Northwest Pakistan,’’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, May 10, 2013, www.rferl.org/content/gandhara-pakistan-religious-parties/ 2498256 5.html. 7. See Jillian Schwedler, ‘‘Can Islamists Become Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion/ Moderation Hypothesis,’’ World Politics 63, no. 2 (2011), for a comprehensive review of recent scholarship on this point. 2. Islam and Democracy in Pakistan 1. Kalyvas, Rise of Christian Democracy. 2. Some surveys put this number as high as 73 percent, with the percentage of Muslims supporting a traditional theocracy as low as 18. See Moataz A. Fattah, Democratic Values in the Muslim World (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2008). Similarly, Ronald Inglehart’s analysis of data from the 1999–2000 World Values Survey (the most recent for which data are available) found that 68 percent of Pakistanis—the second-lowest percentage in the survey—expressed support for democracy. (The country expressing the least support for democracy was Russia, at 62 213 214 NOTES, CHAPTER 2 percent, and the next lowest country before Pakistan was the Philippines, where 82 percent of respondents favored democracy.) See Ronald Inglehart, ‘‘How Solid Is Mass Support for Democracy—and How Can We Measure It?,’’ Political Science and Politics 36, no. 1 (2003): 51–57. Inglehart’s data are swiftly becoming out of date, however; Pakistan was actually polled in 1996, a political lifetime ago. 3. Zakaria, ‘‘Rise of Illiberal Democracy.’’ 4. Rajeev Bhargava, ‘‘The Distinctiveness of Indian Secularism,’’ in The Future of Secularism , ed. T. N. Srinivasan (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2006), 20–53; and Talal Asad, Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003). 5. Esposito and Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam. 6. Iqtidar, Secularizing Islamists?, 7. 7. Ibid. 8. As Dennis Galvan makes clear, this does not meant that political parties in Senegal are completely distinct from organized religious groups. Senegal’s political parties extend the reach of liberal democratic parties (which find their strongest support among the elites and in the urban coastal areas) by distributing patronage to Senegal’s mass populations through the ‘‘familist ’’ networks created by Sufi brotherhoods. The brotherhoods are an ideal vehicle for this purpose because they are trans-ethnic and allow the Senegalese to envision a large, diverse group of members as part of their own ‘‘kin’’ network. What’s more, they ‘‘represent the most legitimate and popular social organizations in the country.’’ See Dennis Galvan, ‘‘Democracy without Ethnic Conflict: Embedded Parties, Transcendent Social Capital and Non-violent Pluralism in Senegal and Indonesia,’’ paper presented at the 97th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, CA, September 2001, 8. While the leaders of the brotherhoods may issue fatwas commanding their followers to vote for a certain candidate, their decision to do so is not based on the candidate’s successful appeal to Islamic values but rather on the result of a purely economic negotiation. 9. My conception of the sharia-secular continuum bears some resemblance to Ishtiaq Ahmed’s typology of four ideological orientations among the Pakistani public, which range from ‘‘a sacred state excluding human will’’ to ‘‘a secular state excluding divine will.’’ Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Concept of an Islamic State: An Analysis of the Ideological Controversy in Pakistan (Stockholm: Edsbruck, University of Stockholm, 1985). As cited in Waseem and Mufti, Religion, Politics and Governance in Pakistan, 12. 10. To be clear, the distinction between Islamists and Muslim democrats concerns the various organizations’ public positions on state enforcement of religious mores and not party members ’ personal adherence to sharia law or practices. Mecham, ‘‘From the Sacred to the State.’’ 11. J. M. Otto, Sharia...

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