Summer Lightning: A Guide to the Second Battle of Manassas

Chapter 5. The Aftermath

Chapter 5 The Aftermath Lee’s victory at Second Manassas moved the center of the war in Virginia from the outskirts of Richmond to within twentyseven miles of Washington. In the early summer of 1862, Union hopes of striking a decisive blow against the Confederacy in the East had been high. Major General George B. McClellan landed his Army of the Potomac on the southern tip of the Virginia Peninsula in March. In April he began moving up the Peninsula, and by the end of May he had advanced to positions just outside of Richmond. It appeared that in time the Confederate capital and a major manufacturing center would fall into Union hands. In addition, Pope and his newly created Army of Virginia in central Virginia posed a credible second threat to Richmond. In the last week of June, Lee, newly appointed to command the army he renamed the Army of Northern Virginia, unleashed a series of attacks (the Seven Days) upon McClellan that forced his army away from Richmond. Lee next turned upon Pope and, after a period of maneuvering, brought him to battle on the plains of Manassas. This victory was the culmination of more than two months of maneuvering and combat that had completely dashed Union hopes for a significant victory in the Eastern Theater in the summer of 1862. This period of time turned the tables in Virginia and shifted the center of conflict from the vicinity of Richmond to just outside Washington, ninety-five miles to the north. Lee’s exceptional success during the campaign and its final battle can be attributed to several decisions and actions by Lee and his senior subordinates. Underlying these decisions was a willingness to weigh the courses of action available and take calculated risks. The Aftermath 250 Primary among them was Lee’s decision to take the initiative and dispatch Jackson on a turning movement around Pope’s right and into the Union rear area. This decision destroyed Pope’s forward supply base at Manassas Junction, cut his route of supply and communication with Washington, forced him to abandon strong positions along the Rappahannock River (turning him out of position), and created a situation where he had to deal with a large enemy force in his rear area. Jackson, after destroying Pope’s supply base, stayed one step ahead of Pope, marched north, and occupied a position in the vicinity of Groveton and the old First Manassas battlefield. From that time until he initiated combat with Union forces on August 28, Jackson disappeared. Believing Jackson was still at Manassas Junction, Pope made an effort to concentrate his army to trap and destroy Jackson. This was too late and to no avail. From that point on, Pope remained one step behind his opponent. Jackson, in order to draw Pope’s forces upon him and delay the junction of Pope’s and McClellan’s armies, disclosed his location late on August 28. He initiated combat with Hatch’s division as it marched east on the Warrenton Turnpike. This told Pope exactly where he was. Pope responded as Jackson had anticipated and ordered his army to the plains of Manassas. The next day Pope fumbled his one good opportunity to severely damage or destroy Jackson’s Left Wing. Rather than form his units into one massive attack, with sufficient reserves, to either envelop or penetrate and break up Jackson’s position, Pope ordered a series of piecemeal attacks that squandered his combat power to no avail. Pope’s rational was that contrary to all available intelligence, Jackson was retreating. These smaller attacks were to hold Jackson in position while another part of his army cut him off from the rest of Lee’s approaching army. Lee’s army was reunited on the same day that Pope thought Jackson was retreating. The arrival of Longstreet’s Right Wing on Jackson’s right flank gave Lee a superior tactical position. Throughout the day Pope apparently had tunnel vision directed toward Jackson and ignored Longstreet’s arrival. Pope carried his obsession with Jackson retreating into absurdity the The Aftermath 251 next day and was not only soundly defeated but almost lost a major portion of his force. Time was against Lee and for a limited period favored Pope—if Pope had only used it wisely. Lee’s pressing concern was that McClellan’s Army of the Potomac, which had been evacuating the Peninsula...