An Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue

Section V. A further Confirmation that we have practical Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our nature; with a further Explication of our Instinct to Benevolence in its various Degrees; with the additional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shame and Pity

148 u s e c t i o n v u A further Confirmation that we have practical Dispositions to Virtue implanted in our Nature; with a further Explication 㛳1 of our Instinct to Benevolence in its various Degrees㛳; with the additional Motives of Interest, viz. Honour, Shame and Pity. I. We have already endeavour’d to prove, “That there is 㛳2 a㛳 universal Determination to Benevolence in Mankind, even toward the most distant parts of the Species:” But we are not to imagine that 㛳3 this Benevolence is equal, or in the same degree toward all.㛳 There are 㛳4 some㛳 nearer and stronger 㛳5 Degrees㛳 of Benevolence, when the Objectsstand in some nearer relations to our selves, which have obtain’d distinct Names; such as natural Affection, 㛳6 and㛳 Gratitude, 㛳7a or when Benevolence is increas’d by greater 㛳8b Love of ab 㛳 Esteem. One Species of natural Affection, viz. That in Parents towards 㛳9 their㛳 Children, has [217] been consider’d already;* we 㛳11 shall only observe further㛳, That there is the same kind of Affection among collateral Relations, tho in a weaker degree; which is universally observable where no Opposition of Interest produces contrary Actions, or counterballances the Power of this natural Affection. 12 We may also observe, that as to the Affection of Parents, it cannot be entirely founded on Merit 㛳13 or㛳 Acquaintance; not only because it is antecedent to all Acquaintance, which might occasion the 㛳14 Loveof㛳 * See above, Sect. ii. Art. 9. Par. 2㛳10 , 3㛳. Degrees of Benevolence. Natural Affection. Not founded on Merit, or Acquaintance. section v 149 Esteem; but because it operates where Acquaintance would produce Hatred, even toward Children apprehended to be vitious. And this Affection is further confirm’d to be from Nature, because it is always observ ’d to descend㛳15 , and not ascend㛳 from Children to Parents mutually . Nature, who seems sometimesfrugal inherOperations,hasstrongly determin’d Parents to the Care of their Children, because they universally stand in absolute need of Support from them; but has left it㛳16 㛳 to Reflection, and a Sense of Gratitude, to produce Returns of Love in Children, toward such tender kind Benefactors, who very seldom stand in such absolute need of Support from their Posterity, as their Chil- [218]dren did from them. Now did Acquaintance, or Merit producenatural Affection, we surely should find it strongest in Children, on whom all the Obligations are laid by a thousand good Offices; whichyetisquite contrary to Observation. Nay, this Principle seems not confin’d toMankind , but extends to other Animals, where yet we scarcely ever suppose any Ideas of Merit; and is observ’d to continue in them no longer than the Necessitys of their Young require. Nor could it be of any service to the Young that it should, since when they are grown up, they can receive little Benefit from the Love of their Dams. But as it is otherwise with rational Agents, so their Affections are of longer continuance, evenduring their whole lives. II. 㛳17 But㛳 nothing will give us a juster Idea of the wise Order in which human Nature is form’d for universal Love, and mutual good Offices, than considering that strong attraction of Benevolence, which we call Gratitude. Every one knows that Beneficence toward our selves makes a much deeper Impression upon us, and raises Gratitude, or a stronger Love toward the Benefactor, than equal Beneficence toward a third Person .* Now because of the 㛳19 vast㛳 Numbers of Mankind, their distant Habi-[219]tations, and the Incapacity of anyonetoberemarkablyuseful to 㛳20 vast㛳 Multitudes; that our Benevolence might not be quite distracted with 㛳21 a multiplicity㛳 of Objects, whose equal Virtues would equally recommend them to our regard; or 㛳22a become useless, by being * See above, Sect. ii. Art. 6. 㛳18 Par. 3㛳. Gratitude. 150 treatise ii equally extended to Multitudes 㛳23b at vast distancesb 㛳, whose Interest we could not understanda 㛳, nor be capable of promoting, having no Intercourse of Offices with them; Nature has 㛳24a more powerfully determin ’d us toadmire, and lovethemoralQualitysof otherswhichaffect our selves, and has given us more powerful Impressions of Good-will 㛳25b towardb 㛳 those who are beneficent to our 㛳26c selvesa 㛳. This we call Gratitude. And thus a Foundation is laidc 㛳 for joyful Associations in all kinds of Business, and virtuous Friendships. By this Constitution also the Benefactor is more encourag’d in his Beneficence, and better secur’d...