The Constitution of England

Chapter XIX

319 u c h a p t e r x i x 1 u A few additional thoughts on the attempts that at particular times may be made to abridge the power of the Crown, and on some of the dangers by which such attempts may be attended. The power of the Crown is supported by deeper, and more numerous, roots, than the generality of people are aware of, as has been observed in a former Chapter; and there is no cause anxiously to fear that the wresting any capital branch of its prerogative, may be effected, in common peaceable times, by the mere theoretical speculations of Politicians. However , it is not equally impracticable thatsome eventof thekindwemention, may be brought about through a conjunction of severalcircumstances.Advantage may, in the first place, be taken of the minority, or even also the inexperience or the errors, of the person invested with the kingly authority. Of this a remarkable instance happened under the reign of King George the First, while that Bill, by which the number of Peers was in future to be limited to a certain number, was underconsiderationintheHouseof Commons , to whom it had been sent from that of the Lords, where it had been passed. So unacquainted was the King at that time with his own interest, and with the constitution of that Government over which he was come to preside, that having been persuaded by that party who wished success to the Bill, that the objection made against it by the House of Commons, was only owing to an opinion they entertained of the Bill being dis- agreeable to him, that he was prevailed upon to send a message to 1. This chapter first appeared in the 1781 edition. 320 book ii them, to let them know that such an opinion was ill-grounded, and that should the Bill pass in their House, it would meet with his assent (a). Considering the prodigious importance of the consequences of such a Bill, the fact is certainly very remarkable (b). With those personal disadvantages under which the Sovereign may lie for defending his authority, other causes of difficulty may concur:—such as popular discontents of long continuance in regard to certain particular abuses of influence or authority. The generality of the Public bent, at that time, both upon remedying the abuses that are complained of, and preventing the like from taking place in future, will perhaps wish to see that branch of the prerogative which gave rise to them, taken from the Crown: a general disposition to applaud such a measure, if effected, will be manifested from all quarters; and at the same time Men may not be aware that the only material consequence that may arise from depriving the Crown of that branch of power which has caused the public complaints, will perhaps be the having transposed that branch of power from its formerseat to another, and having trusted it to new hands, which will be still more likely to abuse it than those in which it was formerly lodged. In general, it may be laid down as a maxim, that Power, under any form of Government, must exist, and be trusted somewhere. If theConstitution does not admit of a King, the governing authority is lodged in the hands of Magistrates. If the Government, at the same time it is a limited one, bears a Monarchical form, those shares of power that are retrenched from the King’s prerogative, most likely continue to subsist, and are vested in a Senate, or Assembly of great Men under some other name of the like kind. Thus, in the Kingdom of Sweden, which, having been a limited Monarchy , may supply examples very applicable to the Government of this Country, we find that the power of convoking the General States (or Par- (a) See the Collection of Parliamentary Debates; I do not remember exactly what Volume. [[In a message conveyed to the House of Lords on March 2, 1719, George I reported that he was “willing that his prerogative stand not in the way” of the passage of the proposed Peerage Bill; see A Collection of the Parliamentary Debates in England . . . , 21 vols. (London, 1739–42), 7:113–14.]] (b) This Bill has been mentioned in page 398. [[For De Lolme’s fuller account of the proposed legislation and its constitutional dangers, see above, book 2, chapter 17, pp. 262–63 and p. 263, note 4.]] [18.119.255.94] Project MUSE (2024-04...