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684 u c h a p t e r v i i i u Of the Moral Virtues in particular. Having explain’d the Original of Dominion, and, by the way, declar’d its Progress thro’ all Society, whether Sacred, or Civil, or between different States, or between the different Parts of the same Family; I will now “proceed to a particular Description of the more limited MoralVirtues.” Something upon this Head I have already suggested in the foregoingDiscourse , where I have shew’d, “That they were contain’d as Parts in that Universal Benevolence enjoyn’d by the Law of Nature.” But, because these Virtues are properly conversant only about such Matter, as is, of right, in our own Power; and because in these there is a distinction between Debts and Gifts, between Superiors andInferiors, betweendifferent States, and between the several Members of the same State, and between the Parts of a Church, or Family; it was necessary tolaydownsomething, in general, concerning the Original of Dominion over Things and Persons , whence all these different Relations arise; and that it was to be deduc ’d from Principles, which did not suppose any Obligation to the special Acts of the Virtues. First, then, we are to observe, that, “As Universal Justice is a Moral Perfection, to which we are therefore oblig’d, because such a Will, or Inclination of Mind, is commanded by the Universal Law of Nature, enjoiningthe settlingandpreservingtoeveryonehisRights;So weought to possess all particular Virtues, or we are therefore oblig’d by them, because they are commanded by some particular Law of Nature, which is contain’d in that Universal One, which I have mention’d.” They are indeed, in their own Nature, Good, tho’ there were no Law, becausethey conduce to the Good State of the Universe: But Moral Obligation, and The Author proceeds to a particular Description of the more limited Moral Virtues. All Obligation to the exercise of Moral Virtues , arises immediately from this, “That such Actions are commanded by the Law of Nature.” moral virtues in particular 685 the Nature of a Debt thence arising, is unintelligible without a respect to a Law, at least, of Nature. Nay, farther; the very Honour, from which Actions are distinguish’d by the Title of [Honestas] laudable Practice,or are called Honourable, seems wholly to come from this, “That they are prais’d by the Law of the supreme Ruler, discover’d by the Light of Nature, and honour’d with the greatest Rewards, among which is to be reckon’d the concurring Praise of Good Men.”1 And justly they are called naturally Lawful and Honourable, because the Law, which makes them such, does not depend upon the Pleasure of the Civil Power, but arises necessarily, in the Manner already explain’d, from the very Nature of Things, and is altogether unchangeable, whilst Nature remains unchang’d.§II. The special Laws of the Moral Virtues may, after this Manner, be deduc’d from the Law of Universal Justice. There being a Law given, which fixes and preserves the Rights of particular Persons, for this End only, That the Common Good of all be promoted by every one, all will be laid under these two Obligations, in order to that End: 1. To contribute to others such a Share of those Things which are committed to their Trust, as may not destroy that Part which is necessary to themselves for the same End: 2. To reserve to themselves that Use of what is their own, as may be most advantageous to, or at least consistent with, the Good of others. In order to explain these Laws, it is to be observ’d, “That others and our-selves are Terms, which, in every one’s Mind, divide the whole System of Rational Beings; and may, indifferently, be referr’d to God and Men”; whence both “his Honour is to be regarded by Men in the consideration of the Common Good”; and he himself may be understood, by an easy Analogy, “to act towards other Rational Agents, according to the Rules of the Moral Virtues.” The former Law, which commands us “to regard others in order to the Common Good,” enjoins Liberality, and the Virtues of common Conversation2 in a strict Sense, (for in a large 1. The language here echoes Cicero’s discussion of true glory from Tusculan Disputations , III.ii.3. 2. Maxwell cites Cumberland’s Latin in a footnote: “Virtutes homileticae.” From the Law requiring the settlement...

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