A Treatise of the Laws of Nature

Chapter I. Of the Nature of Things

289 u c h a p t e r i u Of the Nature of Things. Altho’ the Scepticks and Epicureans of old denied, and others of like Principles still persist in denying, that there are any Laws of Nature;1 we are, nevertheless, on both sides agreed, what is intended by that Name; for we both understand thereby, certain Propositions of unchangeable Truth, which direct our voluntary Actions, about chusing Good andrefusing Evil; and impose an Obligation to external Actions, even without Civil Laws, and laying aside all Consideration of those Compacts, which constitute Civil Government. “That some such Truths are, from the Nature of Things and of Men, necessarily suggested to the Minds of Men, and by them understood and remember’d, (whilst the Faculties of their Minds continue unhurt,) and that therefore they really exist there”; This iswhat we affirm, and our said Adversaries as expressly deny. Wherefore, that the Nature of these Propositions may more plainly appear, it is necessary, that we first examine the Nature of Things universally , then, of Men, and lastly, of Good, as far as they relate to this Question. We must afterwards shew, what sort of PropositionsdirectMens Actions, and naturally carry along with them the Force and Obligation of Laws, as pointing out what is necessary to be done, in order to obtain that End, which Nature has determin’d Men to pursue. Lastly,thatthere 1. The ancient skeptics to whom Cumberland refers probably included Sextus Empiricus, whose works were revived in the sixteenth century. Modern skeptics included Montaigne (Essays, II.12) and Hobbes. For the history of skepticismingeneral during this period, see Popkin, The History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (1979); for the relationship between skepticism and natural law ideas, see Tuck, “The ‘Modern’ Theory of Natural Law” (1987), pp. 99–122. The Laws of Nature, defined. The Author’s Method of Inquiry, concerning their Existence. 290 chapter i are such Laws, will sufficiently appear from the certainty and necessary influence of those Causes which produce them.§II. Nor ought it to seem strange to any, that I said, “That the Nature of Things in the Universe ought first to be consider’d”; because the extensiveFaculties of Man,whichneedmany ThingsfortheirPreservation and Improvement, and are excited by all to Action, can’t be otherwise understood: For how can any one understand, what is most agreeable, or most hurtful, to the human Mind or Body, unless he considers (as far as he is able)2 all those Causes, as well remote, as near, which form’d,and now preserve, Man, and may hereafter support, or destroy, him? Nor is it possible to know, what is the best Thing a Man can do, in the present Case, unless the Effects, as well remote as near, which may proceed from him, in all variety of Circumstances, be foreseen and compar’d among themselves. But the Consideration of the Causes, upon which Men depend , and of those Effects, which may be produc’d by the Concurrence of their Powers, will necessarily lead every Man to consider, not only other Men, wheresoever dispers’d, and himself, as a small part of Mankind , but also this whole Frame of Nature, and God, its first Founder, and supreme Governor. These things being consider’d, in the best manner we are able, our Mind may by some general Conclusions pronounce, “What sort of human Actions chiefly promote the Common Good of all Beings, especially such as are Rational,” wherein each Man’s proper Happiness is contain’d. And we shall hereafter see, that in such Conclusions , provided they be true and necessary, the Law of Nature is contain’d.§III. Yet the Nature of our Undertaking does not require, that weshould take a particular View of all kinds of Beings. We congratulate, indeed, the happy Genius of this learned Age, that the intellectual Part of the World has been much illustrated by that great Accession of Light,which former Proofs of the Being of God, and the Immortality of the Soul have 2. [Maxwell] “Which is as far as is necessary to discover his Obligation to obey the Laws of Nature, as will appear in the Sequel of this Treatise.” The Consideration of the Nature of Things, necessary in this Question; Because all moral Philosophy is finally resolved into the Knowledge of Nature. the nature of things 291 receiv’d from...